Your choice MATor(s) : large-scale quantitative anonymity assessment of Tor path selection algorithms against structural attacks by Backes, Michael et al.
Your Choice MATor(s)
Large-scale Quantitative Anonymity Assessment
of Tor Path Selection Algorithms
Against Structural Attacks
Michael Backes, Sebastian Meiser, Marcin Slowik
Technischer Bericht Nr. A/03/2015
Your Choice MATor(s)
Large-scale Quantitative Anonymity Assessment of Tor Path
Selection Algorithms Against Structural Attacks
Michael Backes, Sebastian Meiser, Marcin Slowik
January 5, 2016
Abstract
In this paper, we present a rigorous methodology for quantifying the anonymity provided by Tor
against a variety of structural attacks, i.e., adversaries that compromise Tor nodes and thereby perform
eavesdropping attacks to deanonymize Tor users. First, we provide an algorithmic approach for com-
puting the anonymity impact of such structural attacks against Tor. The algorithm is parametric in
the considered path selection algorithm and is, hence, capable of reasoning about variants of Tor and
alternative path selection algorithms as well. Second, we present formalizations of various instantia-
tions of structural attacks against Tor and show that the computed anonymity impact of each of these
adversaries indeed constitutes a worst-case anonymity bound for the cryptographic realization of Tor.
Third, we use our methodology to conduct a rigorous, large-scale evaluation of Tor’s anonymity which
establishes worst-case anonymity bounds against various structural attacks for Tor and for alternative
path selection algorithms such as DistribuTor, SelekTOR, and LASTor. This yields the first rigorous
anonymity comparison between different path selection algorithms. As part of our analysis, we quan-
tify the anonymity impact of a path selection transition phase, i.e., a small number of users decides to
run an alternative algorithm while the vast majority still uses the original one. The source code of our
implementation is publicly available.
1 Introduction
The Internet has grown from a small network to an omnipresent backbone of our society that manages and
enables commercial, social, and political activities world-wide. The indisputable benefits of this transforma-
tion are, however, accompanied by novel privacy threats: User activities are constantly tracked and profiled,
and the collected information is used for targeted advertising by industry and for dragnet surveillance at
the planetary scale by almost omnipotent governmental agencies. In fact, new revelations about governmen-
tal observations and large-scale user profiling by various companies make it into the news with distressing
regularity.
As a result, public interest in anonymous communication systems has vastly increased, and millions of
users have started to use anonymizing proxies and VPNs to anonymously browse the web. In particular the
Tor network [14, 5] has received tremendous attention in this respect, both as an end-user solution, currently
serving more than 1.5 million people from all over the world, and as a building block for further anonymizing
systems such as the privacy-preserving operating system Tails [3]. In Tor, a user connects to a sequence of
three proxies (out of a set of currently more than six thousand volunteer proxies, called nodes), and thereby
forms a so-called Tor circuit. The anonymity provided by this construction inherently depends on a user’s
trust in these nodes and on the likelihood of selecting honest or compromised nodes in the circuit generation
phase.
Assessing this degree of anonymity for different trust assumptions has spawned a multitude of research
on analyzing the impact that any compromised Tor node can have on the anonymity of a user. However,
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most existing works provide no rigorous bounds on the provided anonymity. They are instead restricted to
empirical analyses and simulations that strive to measure the anonymity impact of malicious Tor nodes; or
they only consider coarse-grained, all-or-nothing attacks that would result in immediate deanonymization.
The few recent approaches that aim at rigorously quantifying the anonymity of Tor against compromised
nodes are restricted in scope in that they only consider simplistic adversaries and in that they are specific to
individual variants of Tor’s still evolving node selection algorithm. There is a lack of generic, comprehensive
framework that allows for assessing anonymity against a wide selection of structural attacks (i.e., compro-
mising Tor nodes and thereby performing eavesdropping attacks) and for comparing these variants with
each other as well as with recently proposed, alternative path selection algorithms such as DistribuTor [10],
SelekTOR [21], and LASTor [7].
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, we present a rigorous methodology for quantifying the anonymity impact of compromised
Tor nodes for any variant of Tor’s path selection algorithm and alternative path selection algorithms. Our
contribution is twofold: we present an algorithmic approach for computing the worst-case anonymity impact
of adversaries that compromise Tor nodes, and we evaluate the anonymity impact of such adversaries for
different path selection algorithms.
Computing the Anonymity Impact. Algorithmically quantifying the anonymity impact of adversaries
that compromise Tor nodes in a sound manner constitutes a challenging task. We strive to go beyond the
prevalently considered all-or-nothing anonymity assessments, which only consider attacks in which the adver-
sary immediately observes both ends of a communication and, hence, achieves an immediate deanonymiza-
tion. A more careful investigation shows that additional conclusions that reduce anonymity can be drawn
when compromising any node, and these conclusions are no less influential. Tor’s node selection strategies
can depend on properties of the sender (e.g., by using a specific algorithm) and of the recipient (imposing
requirements, such as the supported ports of the connection) of a communication. Hence, we first care-
fully model which observations any subset of Tor nodes can make. After that, we show how to compute
the anonymity impact of such observations for the commonly considered three anonymity notions: sender
anonymity, recipient anonymity, and relationship anonymity. We model arbitrary structural adversaries, in
the sense of compromising nodes in order to mount eavesdropping attacks, using the novel concept of budget
adversaries. Budget adversaries have a certain budget B and a cost function f that assigns a cost to every
Tor node. They can compromise an arbitrary subset of Tor nodes as long as the aggregated node cost does
not exceed the budget. We show that budget adversaries can be instantiated in various ways to model differ-
ent structural attacks against Tor, ranging from k-collusion adversaries that compromise a certain number of
nodes to adversaries that compromise nodes based on geographic locations and adversaries that compromise
nodes subject to monetary constraints. Next, we show how to compute the worst-case anonymity impact of a
budget adversary based on the anonymity impact of the observations of all individual nodes. We then prove
that this computed anonymity impact for every budget adversary indeed constitutes a worst-case anonymity
bound for an idealized version of Tor in the AnoA framework [8] – a recent framework for proving quantita-
tive bounds for anonymous communication protocols; moreover, these bounds are tight for adversaries that
observe exactly one Tor node. Finally, we show that our bounds also hold for the cryptographic realization
of Tor, up to a negligible factor.
Large-scale Evaluation of Tor’s Anonymity. We demonstrate the applicability of our methodology
to large-scale analyses by performing the to date largest rigorous anonymity evaluation of the Tor network.
Based on recent Tor Metrics data [5], we compute anonymity bounds for Tor’s standard path selection
algorithm and several variants thereof, including LASTor [7], SelekTOR [21], DistribuTor [10], and the
uniform routing strategy against a broad variety of structural adversaries. These include including k-collusion
adversaries (compromising a certain number of Tor nodes), bandwidth-adversaries (compromising Tor nodes
of a certain total bandwidth), predicate adversaries (compromising all nodes based on a predicate check,
such as their geographic location or the Tor version they are running), and monetary adversaries that pertain
to economic considerations (compromising selected nodes based on a given price function). Our evaluation
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yields the first rigorous, quantitative anonymity comparison between different path selection algorithms.
Moreover, we explicitly cover the impact of a path selection transition phase, i.e., a small number of users
already uses an alternative path selection algorithm, while the majority still relies on Tor’s standard path
selection algorithm. Our evaluation shows that such pioneers are highly vulnerable, even against adversaries
that compromise only few Tor nodes. Moreover, we explicitly evaluate the advantage of adversaries that
mount so-called guard detection attacks. We consider this to be of particular interest since Tor recently
implemented a novel guard-selecting strategy [13] that restricts users to a single guard over a 9-month
period. Our results in particular show that for a set of guard nodes accounting for approximately 10% of
the entry bandwidth, an adversary that solely inspects the recipient without compromising any nodes can
already distinguish between pairs of senders with a 2.12% advantage, in extreme cases up to 7.65%. The
source code of our implementation is available [2].
1.2 Related Work
The Tor literature is rich on proposals for new path selection algorithms. Some propose to increase the
anonymity of the users [7, 15, 10] by reducing the attack vectors of an adversary that controls part of the
Internet infrastructure or part of the Tor network. Others propose to increase the performance (i.e., expected
latency and throughput) of the Tor network [25]. Several existing works analyze or measure the anonymity of
users within the Tor network. We categorize these into works that strive for rigorous worst-case guarantees
and works that empirically determine anonymity.
In the category of rigorous worst-case guarantees, [17, 8, 16] analyze Tor based on an idealized function-
ality and probabilistic methods. All these works assume that the path selection algorithm chooses nodes
uniformly at random (which Tor does not) and, hence, do not provide rigorous guarantees. Moreover, these
formalizations ignore subtle, yet potentially influential, differences in adversarial observations whenever dif-
ferent senders or recipients impact the probabilities of the selected Tor circuits, e.g., because they use specific
parameters for Tor or even alternative path selection algorithms. Closely related to this paper, Backes et
al. [10] formally analyze Tor’s path selection algorithm and provide an anonymity monitor, which takes
into account real-life parameters such as the number of Tor nodes and their entrusted weight within the Tor
consensus. Their formalization, however, is limited to Tor’s path selection algorithm and DistribuTor (their
own closely related alternative path selection algorithm) and to simplistic k-collusion adversaries. Moreover,
the anonymity guarantees they provide significantly overestimate the adversary’s impact on Tor, as they use
imprecise heuristics for calculating the anonymity impact of malicious Tor nodes on the overall guarantee.
In contrast, we precisely characterize the anonymity impact of observations and only slightly (and explicitly)
over-approximate our worst-case guarantees for budget-adversaries in order to improve the performance of
the computation. Furthermore, our methodology for calculating guarantees directly applies to all variants
of Tor’s path selection algorithm and to all alternative path selections.
In the category of empirical analyses without rigorous anonymity guarantees, Johnson et al. [19] present
a simulation of the Tor network, based on a probabilistic (bandwidth-based) adversary that compromises
a certain percentage of Tor’s bandwidth. Murdoch and Watson [20] present an analysis of proposed path
selection algorithms against (bandwidth-based) adversaries that can inject malicious nodes into the Tor
network, subject to a specific adversarial budget. Their work inspired the formalization of our budget adver-
sary, with the difference that our adversary compromises existing nodes instead of adding new nodes. Other
works strive to analyze Tor against network-level adversaries, which we consider a highly interesting, yet
orthogonal, problem. In this area, Jaggard et al. [18] propose a path selection adaptation based on network
trust to reduce the impact of network adversaries. Wacek et al. [24] analyze the impact of path selection
algorithms on anonymity and performance by simulating a significant fraction of the Tor network, and then
they analyze the anonymity of various path selection algorithms against (AS-level) network adversaries. The
amount of analyses based on simulations and measurements further underlines the importance of a rigor-
ous approach for quantitatively assessing the anonymity of Tor’s path selection algorithm and comparing it
against alternative variants.
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Figure 1: Upper part: A Tor circuit consisting of a sender S0, a guard node ng , a middle node nm , an exit
node nx , and a recipient R0. Colored lines for each node depict the observations this node can make. Lower
part: Further observations for an alternative sender S1 and for an alternative recipient R1 that will be used
to define different anonymity notions.
2 Observations and their Anonymity Impact
In this section, we show how to compute bounds on the anonymity provided by Tor in the presence of an
adversary that can observe the communication at certain Tor nodes and potentially, at the sender or the
recipient of a communication. To begin with, we characterize the possible circuit observations that such
an adversary can make in Tor, introduce the anonymity notions considered in this paper, and show how
to quantitatively assess the impact of circuit observations for each of these notions (Section 2.1). We then
define several adversary classes that reflect different structural compromisations (Section 2.2) and show how
to compute anonymity bounds for Tor against such adversaries (Section 2.3). We later instantiate these
adversary classes with conceivable real-life adversaries, thereby obtaining concrete anonymity bounds for
various adversarial settings.
In this section, we concentrate on the algorithmic aspects of providing anonymity bounds and use the
terms anonymity notion and adversary’s advantage, which are key for the overall anonymity assessment,
only in an informal way. We give formal semantics to these terms in Section 3 and then rigorously prove the
correctness of our computed bounds based on this semantics in Section 4.
Notation. We denote the set of Tor nodes as N , the set of senders as S and the set of recipients as R. We
assume that N , S, and R are pairwise disjoint. We assume two distinguished symbols ⊥ and such that
{⊥, } ∩ (N ∪ S ∪ R) = ∅. ⊥ will later denote that no observation was made at a certain point, and that
any arbitrary observation (including ⊥) has been made at that point.
For a probabilistic algorithm A, we write x ← A to denote that x is probabilistically output by A. We
write Pr [C; Ω] to denote that event C holds true in probability space Ω. We write [Ω] to denote the carrier
set of Ω, i.e., the set of all elements with non-zero probability.
We define φ(Y,Z) as Y − Z if Y > Z, and 0 otherwise.
2.1 Defining Observations and their Anonymity Impact
Compromising any nodes involved in a Tor circuit enables the adversary to draw certain conclusions about
the sender and/or the recipient of the circuit, thereby reducing their degree of anonymity.
Some of these conclusions are straightforward and result in immediate deanonymization: if the guard
node is compromised, the sender is trivially deanonymized as the origin of the communication; similarly,
compromising the exit node unveils the recipient as the destination of the communication. Existing papers
are typically limited to such all-or-nothing observations. However, additional conclusions can be drawn
when compromising any node, and these conclusions are no less influential. For instance, if the adversary
observes or knows that the sender communicates over a specific port, all exit nodes can be excluded that
do not support this port choice, and hence, any communication that involves excluded exit nodes cannot
originate from that sender. Moreover, excluding exit nodes influences the probability of which nodes are
being selected as guard or middle nodes in this circuit by Tor’s path selection algorithm. (The selection
takes so-called family relationships and further constraints into account.) Technically, this means that the
a-priori probability distribution over circuits induced by Tor’s path selection algorithm is now replaced by an
a-posteriori distribution that is conditioned on the observations of the adversary. This enables the adversary
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to draw further conclusions and to thereby reduce anonymity.
Observations. Now we define which observations an adversary is able to make if certain nodes are
considered compromised. We use the distinguished symbol, denoted ⊥, to capture that an observation at a
certain position in the Tor circuit has not been made. Further, we define the overall impact on anonymity
if a given set of nodes is considered compromised.
Definition 1 (Observations and Circuits). We define the set of circuits as C := S ×N 3 ×R and the set of
observations as Obs := (S ∪ {⊥})× (N ∪ {⊥})3 × (R∪ {⊥}) for the distinguished symbol ⊥. Moreover, we
define the set of all observations in which at least one position is observed as Obs 6⊥ = Obs \{(⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥)}.
For a set N ⊆ N ∪S ∪R, we now define the observations O[N ](c) ∈ Obs made by N within a considered
Tor circuit c. Intuitively, whenever a node n ∈ N ∩ N is part of the circuit c, then this node as well as its
successor and predecessor can be observed, see Figure 1. If n ∈ N ∩ (S ∪ R) is part of the circuit c, then
sender and guard node (if n ∈ S) or exit node and recipient (if n ∈ R) can be obseved.
Definition 2 (Circuit Observations). For N ⊆ N ∪ S ∪ R, the circuit observation of N is a function
O[N ] : C → Obs defined as follows. For c = (S,ng ,nm ,nx ,R) ∈ C, we have O[N ](c) := (n1, . . . n5) with
• n1 := S if {S,ng} ∩N 6= ∅; otherwise n1 := ⊥.
• n2 := ng if {S,ng ,nm} ∩N 6= ∅; otherwise n2 := ⊥.
• n3 := nm if {ng ,nm ,nx} ∩N 6= ∅; otherwise n3 := ⊥.
• n4 := nx if {nm ,nx ,R} ∩N 6= ∅; otherwise n4 := ⊥.
• n5 := R if {nx ,R} ∩N 6= ∅; otherwise n5 := ⊥.
We call N the observation points of O.
We furthermore define path selection algorithms.
Definition 3 (Path Selection Algorithms). A probabilistic algorithm ps : S × R → S × N 3 × R is a path
selection algorithm if the following holds: for all S ∈ S and R ∈ R, we have that if (S′, n1, n2, n3,R′) ∈
[ps(S,R)] then S = S′ and R = R′, and n1, n2, n3 are pairwise different.
Anonymity Notions. We consider three common notions of communication anonymity α in this paper:
sender anonymity (α = αSA, i.e., determine who is sending a message), recipient anonymity (α = αRA,
i.e., determine to whom a message is being sent), and relationship anonymity (α = αREL, i.e., determine a
correlation between sender and recipient). Each of these notions is defined as the (in-)ability of an adversary
to distinguish two scenarios that differ in their involved senders and recipients. This follows the established
concept of indistinguishability-based definitions in cryptography (e.g., IND-CCA secure encryption): one of
these two scenarios is selected at random, a Tor circuit is created for this scenario, and the adversary is then
allowed to make observations for this circuit depending on the set of compromised nodes. The adversary
knows the set-up of both scenarios, makes its observations and then has to decide which scenario it currently
observes. The reduction of anonymity is then defined as the adversary’s advantage, i.e., as the probability
of correctly distinguishing both scenarios.
Each of these three notions requires its own two scenarios to define the adversary’s advantage with respect
to this notion. This is illustrated in Figure 1: for sender anonymity, an additional sender S1 is considered,
i.e., the two scenarios differ in the sender, but share the same recipient R0. In addition to its observations
from compromised nodes, the adversary is allowed to compromise the recipient R0 and should be able to
distinguish if the communication originates at S0 or at S1. Similarly, an additional recipient R1 is considered
for recipient anonymity, i.e., the two scenarios differ in the recipient, but share the same sender S0; the
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ImpactobsSA(N) :=
∑
o∈Obs 6⊥
φ
(
Pr [o = O[N ](c), c← ps(S0,R0)] ,Pr [o = O[N ](c), c← ps(S1,R0)]
)
;
ImpactobsRA(N) :=
∑
o∈Obs 6⊥
φ
(
Pr [o = O[N ](c), c← ps(S0,R0)] ,Pr [o = O[N ](c), c← ps(S0,R1)]
)
;
ImpactobsREL(N) :=
∑
o∈Obs 6⊥
φ
((
Pr [o = O[N ](c), c← ps(S0,R0)] + Pr [o = O[N ](c), c← ps(S1,R1)]
)
/2,
(
Pr [o = O[N ](c), c← ps(S0,R1)] + Pr [o = O[N ](c), c← ps(S1,R0)]
)
/2
)
.
Figure 2: Definition of ImpactobsX (N) to define observation impact (Definition 4)
adversary additionally compromises1 the sender S0 and tries to tell R0 and R1 apart. Capturing the absence
of correlations to define relationship anonymity is more involved. We consider both an additional sender S1
and an additional recipient R1: The first relationship anonymity scenario considers the two cases that S0
communicates with R0 and that S1 communicates with R1; the second scenario considers the communication
from S0 to R1 and from S1 to R0. After the scenario has been selected, one of the two described cases for
this scenario is chosen uniformly at random; then a Tor circuit is created for this case and the adversary can
make its observations for this circuit.
Anonymity Impact of Observations. Any circuit observation contributes information that helps an
adversary to distinguish the two scenarios of the considered anonymity notion. For formally defining this
observation impact for a given path selection algorithm ps, consider two senders S0,S1 ∈ S and two re-
cipients R0,R1 ∈ R, and let Sa ∈ {S0,S1} create a circuit to communicate with Rb ∈ {R0,R1}. Then,
the observation impact ImpactobsX (N) for the path selection algorithm ps, the anonymity notion αX , the
considered senders S0,S1 and recipients R0,R1, and a set of observation points N ⊆ N ∪S ∪R, is defined as
the aggregated difference of all circuit observation probabilities for the respective scenarios of the considered
anonymity notion.2
Definition 4 (Observation Impact). Let S0,S1 ∈ S denote two senders, let R0,R1 ∈ R denote two recipi-
ents, let N ⊆ N ∪S ∪R denote a set of observation points, let ps denote a path selection algorithm, and let
αX for X ∈ {SA,RA,REL} be an anonymity notion. Then, ImpactobsX (N), as defined in Figure 2, denotes
the observation impact of N for αX and ps,S0,S1,R0,R1.
For singletons N = {n}, we write ImpactobsX (n) instead of ImpactobsX ({n}).
The empty observation. Although we exclude the empty observation (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥) from our computa-
tions, we will not exclude it from the guarantee itself. An adversary with some background knowledge that
knows about the existence of a Tor circuit, but that makes no observation at all can still learn that none of
its compromised Tor nodes were used in the circuit, which, roughly speaking might be more likely for one of
the scenarios. We will discuss this in more detail after presenting Definition 10.
2.2 Defining Structural Compromisation
In this section, we define different classes of structural adversaries that statically compromise a certain subset
of Tor nodes. For conveniently reasoning about different such adversaries in a unified manner, we define the
1Note that we only consider eavesdropping adversaries. In our methodology compromising any sender, Tor node or recipient
means that the adversary sees all incoming and outgoing traffic. In particular, it cannot copy, modify or relay messages to other
destinations and in case of the sender it also cannot learn the sender’s secret keys.
2For the sake of readability, we did not explicitly include S0,S1,R0,R1 and ps as additional parameters of Impact
obs
X (N)
but consider them clear from the context, similarly in the upcoming definitions. Where necessary to clarify S0,S1,R0,R1 we
write ImpactobsX,S0,S1,R0,R1 (N) for this and upcoming definitions.
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concept of a budget adversary.
Definition 5 (Budget Adversary). Given a cost function f : N → N ∪ {∞} and a budget B ∈ N, an
adversary is called a budget adversary ABf if it can compromise arbitrary sets of Tor nodes N ⊆ N , as long
as
∑
n∈N
f(n) ≤ B.
We provide several instantiations for budget adversaries.
Definition 6 (k-collusion Adversary). A k-collusion adversary is a budget adversary AkfKofN that compromises
up to k nodes of its choice, i.e., fKofN(n) := 1 for n ∈ N .
Definition 7 (Predicate Adversary). A predicate adversary is a budget adversary A1fP that compromises
all nodes that fulfill a given predicate P , i.e., fP (n) := 0 if P (n) = true, and fP (n) :=∞ otherwise.
Examples of predicate adversaries include geographic adversaries that compromise all nodes within a
certain country or a collaboration of countries, Tor-Version adversaries that can exploit vulnerabilities
of specific versions of the Tor software and can compromise all nodes that run this version, and subnet
adversaries that compromise all Tor nodes within a specific IP-subnet.
Definition 8 (Bandwidth Adversary). A resource-constrained bandwidth adversary, or bandwidth adversary
for short, is a budget adversary ABfBW that compromises an arbitrary set of Tor nodes with at most an overall
bandwidth of B, i.e., for n ∈ N , we have fBW(n) := n.BW for n ∈ N , where n.BW denotes the bandwidth of
node n.
This adversary model allows us to provide anonymity bounds in the presence of adversaries that manage
to observe a certain percentage of all traffic within the Tor network, e.g., by adding fake nodes or by assuming
control over existing nodes.
Definition 9 (Monetary Adversary). A monetary adversary is a budget adversary ABf$ that compromises
Tor nodes with a monthly monetary maintenance and renting cost of at most B. For a set of providers
P and a function price : P × N → N that assigns a price for each provider and offered bandwidth, we have
f$(n) := price(n.provider,n.BW) for n ∈ N , where n.provider and n.BW denotes the provider and the
bandwidth of node n, respectively.
Monetary adversaries reflect adversaries with a limited budget for the operational cost of running Tor
nodes.
2.3 Anonymity Impact of a Budget Adversary
We now combine our formalization of observations and of their anonymity impact from Section 2.1 with
our definition of a budget adversary. Thereby, we compute a bound on the anonymity impact of a budget
adversary on Tor’s path selection algorithm for each of the three considered anonymity notions.
A straight forward method for computing a bound on the impact of a budget adversary is to enumerate
all possible sets of nodes that this adversary could compromise, to compute the observational impact of every
one of these sets, and to output the maximal such impact. To the best of our knowledge this in practice
requires a huge computational effort, as for most budget adversaries, the intricate nature of the observational
impact would require us to compute the impact of each such set sequentially. In this paper we instead derive
a methodology to soundly approximate the anonymity impact of each individual Tor node. After calculating
these impacts once, we can then apply existing integer linear maximization techniques to give a bound on
the impact of the maximal set of nodes.
We distinguish two kinds of impact in the following that contribute to the overall anonymity impact
of a Tor node: direct anonymity impact and indirect anonymity impact. Direct impact considers those
information gained from observing compromised and honest nodes, senders and recipients. Indirect impact
is more subtle: it captures what the adversary can additionally learn from the absence of observations, i.e.,
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which compromised Tor nodes were not used in the circuit, and from which it can hence draw corresponding
conclusions. In the following, we elaborate on both cases separately first.
Direct Anonymity Impact. The direct anonymity impact of a Tor node represents the observation
impact (Definition 4) of this node in all circuits in which it is present, i.e., of all observations that contain
the node. For sender anonymity and recipient anonymity, we consider only one node at a time, whereas for
relationship anonymity, we also consider observations made by pairs of nodes. In the following, we explain
this strategy for each of the anonymity notions.
For the direct anonymity impact on sender anonymity, a compromised guard node is sufficient. Con-
sequently, each direct impact made by a compromised guard node in combination with any other node is
also already made by this guard node alone. Each observation made by a compromised middle node in
combination with the compromised recipient equals the observation made by a compromised middle node
and a compromised exit node in the same circuit. Thus, for the direct impact it suffices to consider each
compromised node n individually by calculating ImpactobsSA(n). For the direct anonymity impact on recip-
ient anonymity, the reasoning is analogous to the reasoning for sender anonymity, where for every node n
we now calculate ImpactobsRA(n). For relationship anonymity, the observations made by all three nodes in
a circuit equals the observation made by the guard node and the exit node. Thus, it suffices to consider
all observations in which one or two nodes are compromised. We divide the set of all observations into the
set of observations made by individual nodes and the observations made by two nodes. For the first set
of observations, analogously to sender anonymity and recipient anonymity, we consider each compromised
n individually by calculating ImpactobsREL(n). For additionally considering the second set of observations,
we define two helper functions Impactobs−2REL and Impact
combined
REL , see Figure 3. The intuition behind these
functions is as follows:
• Impactobs−2REL ({n,n ′}) defines the direct impact that a pair of nodes n and n ′ have on relationship
anonymity. Formally, this is defined as the observation impact of {n,n ′} over all observations o ∈ Obs2,
i.e., all observations that are made by two or more compromised nodes in a circuit.
• ImpactcombinedREL (n) soundly combines the observational impact ImpactobsREL(n) of n individually with a
worst-case approximation over the direct impact of every pair of n with other compromised nodes n ′.
Indirect Anonymity Impact. The indirect anonymity impact of a Tor node represents the observation
impact of this node on all circuits in which it is not present. The observation that a compromised node is
not present in a circuit can significantly modify the anonymity impact of an observation, as illustrated by
the following example.
Example 1 (Indirect Impact). Consider the following set of circuits: XS0,ng ,nm :=
{c = (S,ng ′,nm ′,nx ′,R) | ng ′ = ng ∧ nm ′ = nm ∧ S = S0} for a guard node ng and a middle node
nm . On each circuit c ∈ XS,ng ,nm , an adversary that only compromises the guard makes the observation
o := O[{ng}](c) = (S0,ng ,nm ,⊥,⊥) independently of the exit node and the recipient. By adding an exit
node nx to the set of compromised nodes, the probability for the observation o changes. Whenever nx is
the exit node of the circuit, instead of o the adversary will make the observation (S0,ng ,nm ,nx ,R). If the
compromised exit node is more likely to be used for one specific recipient R, then not observing the exit node
in this scenario leaks information about the recipient.
We consequently capture the impact of unobserved compromised nodes by adding the impact of their
absence to any given observation made by another compromised node. To formally define the indirect
impact ImpactindX for anonymity notion αX , we define several helper functions for computing Impact
ind
X ,
see Figure 4. The intuition behind these functions is as follows:
• Impact(ab,cd)indirect (ng ,nx ) defines the mutual indirect impact that a compromised guard node ng has on
the observations of a compromised exit node nx , and vice versa.
• ImpactRec1 and ImpactRec2 describe the impact of compromised nodes on observations made by a
compromised recipient (as used for sender anonymity): The first notion ImpactRec1 considers the im-
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ImpactcombinedREL (n,ABf ) := ImpactobsREL(n) + max
K
B−f(n),f
⊆ N
( ∑
n′∈K
Impactobs−2REL ({n,n ′})
)
Impactobs−2REL (N) :=
∑
o∈Obs2
φ
((
Pr [o = O[N ](c); c← ps(S0,R0)] + Pr [o = O[N ](c); c← ps(S1,R1)]
)
/2,
(
Pr [o = O[N ](c); c← ps(S0,R1)] + Pr [o = O[N ](c); c← ps(S1,R0)]
)
/2
)
where the set of observations that are made by two or more compromised nodes in a circuit is defined
as Obs2 = {S0,S1} × N 3 × {⊥} ∪ {⊥} ×N 3 × {R0,R1} ∪ {S0,S1} × N 3 × {R0,R1}
Figure 3: Helper functions for the direct impact of nodes, as used in Figure 6.
pact that any individual (compromised) node may have on the (lack of) observations of a compromised
recipient; the second one ImpactRec2 bounds the maximal error in calculating the first one.
• ImpactSen1 and ImpactSen2 analogously describe the impact of compromised nodes on observations
made by a compromised sender (as used for recipient anonymity).
Based on these helper functions, the indirect impact ImpactindX is defined in Figure 5. We explain this
definition for all three cases of X:
Indirect anonymity impact for sender anonymity. ImpactindSA is computed by combining the indirect impact
of compromised guard nodes on observations made by exit nodes (Impact
(10,00)
indirect ) with the impact of com-
promised guard nodes and middle nodes on the observations made by the recipient alone (ImpactRec1 and
ImpactRec2). Whenever a compromised node is more likely to be used as a guard node (or middle node) by
the sender S1, then not observing this node is is more likely when the sender is S0.
Indirect anonymity impact for recipient anonymity. ImpactindRA is computed by combining the indirect
impact of compromised exit nodes on observations made by guard nodes (Impact
(01,00)
indirect ) with the impact of
compromised middle nodes and exit nodes on the observations made by the sender alone (ImpactSen1 and
ImpactSen2). Whenever a compromised node is more likely to be used as an exit node (or middle node) for
contacting the recipient R1, then not observing this node is is more likely when the recipient is R0.
Indirect anonymity impact for relationship anonymity. ImpactindREL is computed by combining all possible
ways in which compromised guard nodes can impact observations of compromised exit nodes and vice versa.
The observations of compromised guard nodes contain the sender of a communication and thus the adversary
only needs to find out the recipient, making these cases comparable to the case of recipient anonymity; the
observations of compromised exit nodes contain the recipient of a communication and thus the adversary
only needs to find out the sender of a communication, making these cases comparable to sender anonymity.
Since for relationship anonymity the set of observation points N neither contains any of the senders or
recipients, the indirect impacts of senders and recipients do not apply here.
Defining the Anonymity Impact. We finally give the overall definition of anonymity impact ; we will
explain it for the individual anonymity notions in detail after the definition.
Definition 10 (Anonymity Impact). Let S0,S1 be two senders, let R0,R1 be two recipients, let ps be a
path selection algorithm, let αX for X ∈ {SA,RA,REL} be an anonymity notion, and let ABf be a budget
adversary. Then, ImpactX(ABf ), as defined in Figure 6, defines the anonymity impact of ABf for αX and
ps,S0,S1,R0,R1.
The computation of the anonymity impact ImpactX(ABf ) depends on the considered anonymity notion
αX as follows.
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Impact
(ab)(cd)
indirect (ng ,nx ) :=
∑
nm∈N
φ(P abng ,nm ,nx , P
cd
ng ,nm ,nx )
ImpactRec1(n) :=
∑
nx∈N
φ(
∑
n′∈N
(P 10n,n′,nx + P
10
n′,n,nx ),
∑
n′∈N
(P 00n,n′,nx + P
00
n′,n,nx ))
ImpactRec2(n,n
′) :=
∑
nx∈N
φ(P 00n,n′,nx + P
00
n′,n,nx , P
10
n,n′,nx + P
10
n′,n,nx )
ImpactSen1(n) :=
∑
ng∈N
φ(
∑
n′∈N
(P 01ng ,n,n′ + P
01
ng ,n′,n),
∑
n′∈N
(P 00ng ,n,n′ + P
00
ng ,n′,n))
ImpactSen2(n,n
′) :=
∑
ng∈N
φ(P 00ng ,n,n′ + P
00
ng ,n′,n , P
01
ng ,n,n′ + P
01
ng ,n′,n)
where N
B,f
⊆ N := N ⊆ N s.t .
∑
n∈N
f(n) ≤ B
P abng ,nm ,nx := Pr [(Sa,ng ,nm ,nx ,Rb) = c; c← ps(Sa,Rb)]
Figure 4: Helper functions for the indirect impact of nodes, as used in Figure 5.
Sender anonymity. The impact of any budget adversary ABf on sender anonymity constitutes at most the
aggregated observation impact of the optimal set of compromised nodes together with the observation impact
ImpactobsSA (R0) of the compromised recipient R0 (which is assumed for sender anonymity) and the indirect
impact on sender anonymity, c.f., Equations (1) in Figures 5 and 6. For sender anonymity we do not need to
consider the empty observation o = (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥), as we can soundly assume that the recipient is always
compromised, which always leads to a non-empty observation.
Recipient anonymity. Analogously, the impact of any budget adversary ABf on recipient anonymity is,
at most, the aggregated observation impact of the optimal set of compromised nodes together with the
observation impact ImpactobsRA (S0) of the compromised sender S0 (which is assumed for recipient anonymity)
and the indirect impact on recipient anonymity, c.f., Equations (2) in Figures 5 and 6. For recipient anonymity
we do not need to consider the empty observation o = (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥), as we can soundly assume that the
sender is always compromised, which always leads to a non-empty observation.
Relationship anonymity. Analogously, the impact on any budget adversary ABf on relationship anonymity
is, at most, the aggregated observation impact of the optimal set of compromised nodes and the indirect
impact on relationship anonymity, c.f., Equations (3) in Figures 5 and 6. In contrast to sender anonymity
and recipient anonymity, we need to consider a combination of nodes for the direct impact of relationship
anonymity, see combinedREL in Figure 4.
For relationship anonymity we technically assume that the empty observation o = (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥) has an
anonymity impact of zero, while practically capturing the empty observation by calculating the anonymity
impact in both directions, i.e., not only computing a guarantee for the scenarios with b = 0 (S0 communicates
with R0 or S1 communicates with R1) against the scenarios with b = 1 (S0 communicates with R1 or S1
communicates with R0), but also vice versa.
Precision of our Calculation. For all circuit observations made by sets of compromised nodes, indi-
vidual nodes, pairs of nodes, and sender or recipient, our calculation of ImpactobsSA(N), Impact
obs
RA(N) and
ImpactobsREL(N) precisely captures the anonymity impact for the respective notion. However, when we ag-
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(1) ImpactindSA(n,ABf ) := ImpactRec1(n) + max
N
B−f(n),f
⊆ N
∑
n′∈N
(
Impact
(10)(00)
indirect (n,n
′) + ImpactRec2(n,n
′)
)
(2) ImpactindRA(n,ABf ) := ImpactSen1(n) + max
N
B−f(n),f
⊆ N
∑
n′∈N
(
Impact
(01)(00)
indirect (n
′,n) + ImpactSen2(n,n
′)
)
(3) ImpactindREL,Sa,Sc,Rb,Rd(n,ABf ) := max
K
B−f(n),f
⊆ N\{n}
(
1
2
(
Impact
(ad)(ab)
indirect (n,n
′) + Impact(cb)(cd)indirect (n,n
′)
+Impact
(ad)(cd)
indirect (n
′,n) + Impact(cb)(ab)indirect (n
′,n)
))
Figure 5: Definition of indirect impact (for Definition 10)
(1) ImpactSA(ABf ) := ImpactobsSA (R0) + max
N
B,f
⊆ N
∑
n∈N
(
ImpactobsSA (n) + Impact
ind
SA(n,ABf )
)
(2) ImpactRA(ABf ) := ImpactobsRA (S0) + max
N
B,f
⊆ N
∑
n∈N
(
ImpactobsRA (n) + Impact
ind
RA(n,ABf )
)
(3) ImpactREL(ABf ) := max
(
δREL(ABf , 0, 1), δREL(ABf , 1, 0)
)
where δREL(ABf , b, d) := max
N
B,f
⊆ N
∑
n∈N
(
ImpactcombinedREL,S0,S1,Rb,Rd(n,ABf ) + ImpactindREL,S0,S1,Rb,Rd(n,ABf )
)
Figure 6: Definition of ImpactX(ABf ) , in order to define anonymity impact (Definition 10)
gregate the impact of individual nodes in ImpactX in order to derive our overall bounds for the anonymity
impact of a budget adversary, we might count observations made for the same circuit more than once, and
therefore over-approximate the impact of the individual observations. Moreover, our bound on the (indirect)
impact of nodes soundly overestimates the impact. We decided to accept this slight over-approximation for
reasons of performance and scalability, as it allows us to compute bounds for budget adversaries based on
each node individually; otherwise, we would have to combine all possible observations of all subsets of the
set of nodes that fall within the budget. Furthermore, we implicitly assume that an adversary can mount
traffic correlation attacks with perfect accuracy, i.e., whenever it observes traffic at two different points
in the Tor network, we assume that the adversary can determine if this traffic belongs to the same Tor
circuit. This assumption is motivated by the high accuracy achieved by recent work on traffic correlation
attacks [23, 19, 20]; yet, it still constitutes an over-approximation.
3 Theoretical Underpinning
We now provide a rigorous semantics for the concepts that we informally used in the previous section, such
as anonymity notions and the adversary’s advantage. To this end, we cast all required formalizations in
the AnoA framework [8], a framework for computing quantitative bounds for anonymous communication
systems. By means of this embedding into AnoA, we show that ImpactX(ABf ), as defined in Definition 10,
computes a bound for the notion of adversary’s advantage in the AnoA framework for budget adversaries
ABf . In addition, we show the secure compositionality of budget adversaries in AnoA, which might be of
independent interest.
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3.1 Game-based Anonymity in AnoA
Anonymity Notions. The formalization of the three anonymity notions in AnoA closely follows the
informal description that we gave in Section 2.1 as a challenge-response game, in which the adversary has to
distinguish two scenarios. Formally, an anonymity notion is a function α that receives as inputs two senders:
S0 and S1, two recipients: R0 and R1, and a so-called challenge bit b. It then selects one sender and one
recipient, based on the challenge bit and the considered anonymity notion. For relationship anonymity, this
selection is probabilistic.
Sender anonymity αSA. The sender anonymity function αSA selects the sender according to the challenge
bit and always considers the same recipient R0:
αSA(S0,S1,R0,R1, b) := (Sb,R0).
Recipient anonymity αRA. The recipient anonymity function αRA selects the recipient according to the
challenge bit and always considers the same sender S0:
αRA(S0,S1,R0,R1, b) := (S0,Rb).
Relationship anonymity αREL. The relationship anonymity function αREL selects one of the four possible
sender-recipient combinations as follows: if b = 0, the function randomly selects one of the two pairs (S0,R0)
or (S1,R1); if b = 1, it randomly selects between (S0,R1) and (S1,R0). In short, we obtain
αRA(S0,S1,R0,R1, b) := (Sb′ ,Rb⊕b′); b′ ←R {0, 1} .
Game-based Anonymity Definition. The definition of the AnoA challenger is the final building block for
the definition of the adversary’s advantage in AnoA as a challenge-response game. In the AnoA framework,
the challenger receives as input an anonymity notion α, a bound on the permitted challenge-messages (see-
below), two senders, two recipients, a path selection algorithm and the challenge bit. It then simulates the
Tor protocol for the sender-recipient scenario selected by α. The adversary interacts with the challenger in
order to determine which scenario is being simulated. The adversary knows all inputs to the challenger up
to an uncertainty of one bit (the challenge bit b). We now describe the challenger in detail.
The AnoA challenger. The challenger Ch is defined in Figure 7. As described above, it expects as inputs
the anonymity notion α, a bound γ on the permitted challenge-messages, two senders S0, S1, two recipients
R0, R1, the path selection algorithm ps and the challenge bit b. The challenger initially waits for a set
N ⊆ N ∪S ∪R of compromised Tor nodes, senders and recipients. The challenger first removes illegitimate
compromisation requests for senders and recipients: S0,S1 is removed from N for sender anonymity, R0,R1
is removed from N for recipient anonymity, and both S0,S1 and R0,R1 are removed from N for relationship
anonymity, which reflects the respective scenarios. Then, it accepts two types of messages from the adversary:
challenge-messages, denoted as (challenge,m) in Figure 7, that trigger that a challenge message is sent, and
input-messages, denoted as (input,S,m,R) in Figure 7, that send additional messages m between senders S
and recipients R:
• Challenge-messages: Upon receiving a message (challenge,m), the challenger increases Ψ and only
proceeds if Ψ is still less than or equal to γ. It then computes the anonymity notion α on (S0,S1,R0,R1)
and the challenge bit b and obtains a sender-recipient pair (S∗,R∗) ∈ {S0,S1} × {R0,R1}. The
challenger then simulates the Tor protocol by creating a new Tor circuit (ng ,nm ,nx ) from sender S
∗
to recipient R∗, and then sends the message m from S∗ to R∗ using Tor. We abbreviate this using
the subroutine SimulateTor(S∗,m,R∗) in Figure 7. Whenever a node n involved in the constructed
circuit is considered compromised, i.e., n ∈ N , then the adversary is given the transcript of this
communication, i.e., the messages n sent and received in this circuit.
• Input-messages: Upon receiving a message (input,S,m,R), the challenger calls the subroutine
SimulateTor(S,m,R), as described above. Input-messages, hence, capture additional information
the adversary may have about the communication contents in the Tor network, e.g., by starting Tor
communications on its own.
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We now define the reduction of anonymity for α as the adversary’s advantage in this game.
Definition 11 (Reduction of Anonymity; Advantage). Let α be an anonymity notion, γ ∈ N, S0,S1 two
senders, R0,R1 two recipients, and ps a path selection algorithm. Then, the adversary’s advantage of an
adversary A for these parameters is at most δ, with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, if for all sufficiently large η ∈ N, we have
Pr [0 = 〈A(1η)||Ch(α, γ,S0,S1,R0,R1, ps, 0)〉]
≤ Pr [0 = 〈A(1η)||Ch(α, γ,S0,S1,R0,R1, ps, 1)〉] + δ.
We say that Tor exhibits a reduction of anonymity of at most δ under γ challenges (formally: Tor is
(δ, γ)-IND-ANO) for these parameters α,S0,S1,R0,R1, ps and a class A of adversaries if the adversary’s
advantage of all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A ∈ A is at most δ.
This definition captures an eavesdropping adversary that compromises a fixed set of nodes before it starts
observing the network. In particular, the adversary cannot adaptively decide which nodes to compromise.3
Relation to Entropy-based Anonymity Notions. Our indistinguishability-based notion reasons about
the cryptographic implementation of Tor. For such cryptographic systems with their computational security
guarantees, entropy-based notions, including notions that define the effective size of an anonymity set [22, 12],
are not directly applicable. A relation between entropy-based notions and cryptographic notions might be
possible along the lines of [11] that establishes a tight correspondence between the information-theoretic
capacity of channels, their abstract description and finally their cryptographic instantiations. We plan to
investigate this approach in the context of more comprehensive systems such as Tor in future work.
3.2 Budget Adversaries in AnoA
We now cast the notion of a budget adversary in AnoA. Intuitively, an adversary is a budget adversary if
the set of compromised nodes that it sends to the challenger conforms to its budget restrictions.4
Definition 12 (AnoA Budget Adversary). Consider a cost function f : N → N∪{∞} and a budget B ∈ N.
Then a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary ABf is an AnoA budget adversary for f and B, if for all
possible outputs N of ABf to the AnoA challenger in its first message, we have that
∑
n∈M f(n) ≤ B for
M := N \ (S ∪R). We let ABf denote the class of all budget adversaries for f and B.
All instantiations of budget adversaries defined in Section 2.2 can be cast in AnoA in an analogous
manner.
As a result that we consider to be of independent interest, we show that anonymity guarantees for
individual challenges against an AnoA budget adversary entail anonymity guarantees for an arbitrary (fixed)
amount of challenges (for different, but related parameters). Formally, AnoA budget adversaries ABf are
composable for every budget B and every cost function f .
Theorem 1 (Composition). If Tor is (δ, 1)-IND-ANO for an anonymity notion α, two senders S0,S1 ∈ S,
two recipients R0,R1 ∈ R, a path selection algorithm ps, and the class of budget adversaries ABf , then, Tor
is also (γ · δ, γ)-IND-ANO for α, S0,S1,R0,R1, ps and ABf , for every γ ∈ N.
Proof. To show the Theorem, we leverage the composition theorem of [10]. To this end, we use the original
formulation of AnoA and consider budget adversaries as wrapper machines ABf (·) that internally run an
3The corresponding definition in the AnoA paper [8] additionally considers a multiplicative advantage eε. We have set
this to 1 in this paper, such that δ directly corresponds to the reduction of anonymity. Moreover, AnoA considers arbitrary
probabilistic, polynomial-time Turing machines and, for technical reasons, subsequently restricts them with wrapper machines
(so-called adversary classes). For the sake of presentation in our specific setting, we did not introduce the lengthy description
of adversary classes, but instead restricted the adversary in the core definition and adjusted the challenger accordingly.
4An alternative, yet slightly more technical way of defining budget adversaries in AnoA is by using the concept of adversary
classes provided by AnoA: in this case, a budget adversary would be a wrapper machine that internally runs an arbitrary
adversary as a black box, but ensures that only compromisation requests N are being forwarded to the AnoA challenger that
satisfy
∑
n∈M f(n) ≤ B for M := N \ (S ∪R). We opted for the technically simpler definition in this paper.
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AnoA Challenger Ch(α, γ,S0,S1,R0,R1, ps, b)
Initial message (compromisation setting)
Receive N ⊆ N ∪ S ∪R as input.
if α = αSA, let N := N \ {S0,S1}.
if α = αRA, let N := N \ {R0,R1}.
if α = αREL, let N := N \ {S0,S1,R0,R1}.
Ψ := 0.
Upon message (input,S,m,R)
Run SimulateTor(S,m,R).
Upon message (challenge,m)
Ψ := Ψ + 1.
if Ψ ≤ γ then
Compute (S∗,R∗)← α(S0,S1,R0,R1, b)
Run SimulateTor(S∗,m,R∗)
else abort the game.
Subroutine SimulateTor(S,m,R)
Simulate the Tor protocol:
c = (S,ng ,nm ,nx ,R)← ps(S,R)
S sends m to R via the circuit c.
for each n ∈ {S,ng ,nm ,nx ,R} ∩N do
Output the transcript of n in c.
Figure 7: Definition of the AnoA Challenger
arbitrary PPT adversary A and ensure that the compromisation requests of A satisfies the constraints of a
budget adversary for f and B. The composition requires that for every function f , every B ∈ N and for
every anonymity function α, the adversary class ABf is composable as in Definition 3 from [10], i.e., that
it satisfies the three properties reliability (the class does not start challenges on its own), alpha-renaming
(the challenge counter holds no semantical meaning) and simulatability (the challenges are not handled
structurally different than input messages).
Reliability: By construction, ABf (A) sends messages (challenge,m) if and only if it receives a message
(challenge,m) from A. Thus, ABf (A) is reliable.
Alpha-renaming: As the functional behavior of ABf (·) is completely agnostic to the challenge counter Ψ,
ABf (A) trivially satisfies alpha-renaming.
Simulatability: As, by construction, ABf (A) only forwards challenge and input messages, we construct the
following “trivial simulator” SαS0,S1,R0,R1 for any anonymity notion α and any two pairs of senders S0,S1
and recipients R0,R1. For a string ~z = [(z1, b1), . . . , (zn, bn)] ∈ {0, 1}2n, Sα~z behaves as follows. If zi =
sim, it replaces all messages (challenge,m) by (input,S∗,m,R∗), where (S∗,R∗)← α(S0,S1,R0,R1, bi).
For every ~z ∈ {0, 1}2n, the simulator Sα~z satisfies the conditions from Definition 3 in [10].
Since ABf (A) satisfies all three necessary conditions, it is composable.
Remark: The proof for Theorem 1 also holds for the original, more complex description of the AnoA
challenger from [8] in which the adversary chooses the senders and recipients for the challenges. In this case,
the simulator computes α on the senders and recipients chosen by A instead of on the given fixed senders and
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recipients. Moreover, the proof is oblivious to the definition of the anonymity function α and also applies to
the session definitions in [10].
3.3 Correctness of ImpactX bounds
We now show that ImpactX(ABf ), as defined in Definition 10, closely corresponds to the notion of adversary’s
advantage in the AnoA framework for budget adversaries ABf , thereby establishing the output of ImpactX
as accurate bounds for Tor against such adversaries.
We first show that our calculation of observation impact exactly corresponds to the optimal advantage
of any adversary that makes those observations, provided that the adversary exactly compromises all nodes
in a fixed set N , that it only sends a single challenge-message, and that we consider an idealization of
cryptography. We call an advantage of δ optimal for a class of adversaries A if the adversary’s advantage for
sufficiently large η is at most δ for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A ∈ A and if there exists an
adversary A ∈ A that achieves this advantage, i.e., the less-or-equal in Definition 11 is replaced by equality
for A for sufficiently large η.
For senders S0,S1, recipients R0,R1, and X ∈ {SA,RA,REL}, let AS0,S1,R0,R1,X be the class of proba-
bilistic, polynomial-time adversaries that compromise N ⊆ N ∪{S0,S1,R0,R1} s.t. they are allowed by the
anonymity notion, and that only send one challenge-message to Ch. More precisely, AS0,S1,R0,R1,X sends a set
N ⊆ N ∪S ∪R to Ch as the compromised nodes, senders and recipients, and we have that N ∩{S0,S1} = ∅
if X ∈ {SA,REL} and that N ∩ {R0,R1} = ∅ if X ∈ {RA,REL}.
To define the idealization of cryptography, we define an idealized AnoA challenger Ch∗. Ch∗ is defined
exactly as Ch, with the only difference that in the subroutine SimulateTor, where Ch sends the transcript
of messages sent by and received by nodes and recipients A, Ch∗ only sends the compromised nodes n of
a circuit together with their predecessor and successor to A. This models that the adversary cannot gain
information about the content of encrypted messages, but that it can still determine at which point(s) in
the challenge circuit it makes an observation, and then derive predecessor and successor. The only exception
is that if the observation is made at the exit node or at the recipient, then the adversary would be able to
see the message. However, since the adversary is allowed to choose the message in the interaction with the
challenger anyway, observing it does not reveal additional information.
Lemma 1. For every anonymity notion αX with X ∈ {SA,RA,REL}, all senders S0,S1 ∈ S, all recipients
R0,R1 ∈ R, and every path selection algorithm ps, we have that the optimal advantage for AS0,S1,R0,R1,X is
equal to ImpactobsX (N).
Proof. Let S0,S1 ∈ S be two senders, R0,R1 ∈ R two recipients, ps a path selection algorithm, and let N ⊆
N ∪S∪R denote the output to Ch∗. We can ignore all senders and recipients from (S∪R)\{S0,S1,R0,R1},
i.e., senders or recipients that are not contained in the challenge circuit, as the observations made by these
are independent of the bit b of the challenger.
Hence assume that N ⊆ N ∪ {S0,S1,R0,R1}. Since Ch∗ only notifies the adversary if there is
communication at entities from N , any adversary in A hence only makes observations o ∈ Obs, i.e.,
o ∈ {S0,S1,⊥}× (N ∪{⊥})3×{R0,R1,⊥}. Since N ∩{S0,S1} = ∅ if X ∈ {SA,REL} and N ∩{R0,R1} = ∅
if X ∈ {RA,REL} (these cases are immediately removed by the challenger), we have that the adversary
makes observations at precisely the observation points in N .
We only prove the lemma for sender anonymity; the adaptation to recipient anonymity and relationship
anonymity is straightforward. We first divide the set of all observations Obs into two subsets, depending
on their probability and the challenge bit. We set Obs0 := {o ∈ Obs | Pr [o = O[N ](c); c← ps(S0,R0)]
> Pr [o = O[N ](c); c← ps(S1,R0)]}, and Obs1 := Obs\Obs0. An adversaryA hence maximizes its advantage
by outputting 0 if and only if it makes an observation o ∈ Obs0. For i ∈ {0, 1}, we obtain
Pr [0← 〈A(1η)||Ch(α, 1,S0,S1,R0,R1, ps, i)〉]
=
∑
o∈Obsi
Pr [o = O[N ](c); c← ps(Si,R0)]
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We are left to show that the advantage of this adversary A is equal to ImpactobsSA(N):
Pr [0← 〈A||Ch(α, 1,S0,S1,R0,R1, ps, 0)〉]
− Pr [0← 〈A||Ch(α, 1,S0,S1,R0,R1, ps, 1)〉]
=
∑
o∈Obs0
Pr [o = O[N ](c); c← ps(S0,R0)]
−
∑
o∈Obs1
Pr [o = O[N ](c); c← ps(S1,R0)]
=
∑
o∈Obs
φ
(
Pr [o = O[N ](c); c← ps(S0,R0)] ,
Pr [o = O[N ](c); c← ps(S1,R0)]
)
= ImpactobsSA(N).
Using Lemma 1 we can now show our main theorem.
Theorem 2 (Soundness). For every anonymity notion αX with X ∈ {SA,RA,REL}, all senders S0,S1 ∈ S,
all recipients R0,R1 ∈ R, every path selection algorithm ps, and every budget B and every cost function f ,
Tor is (δ, 1)-IND-ANO for the class of budget adversaries ABf , where δ = ImpactX(A
B
f ), as calculated in
Section 2.2, up to a negligible additive factor.
Since the proof of this theorem is involved, we dedicate the next section to it.
4 Proof of Soundness
We start with an overall proof outline. After that, we define the visible elements and the core of an
observation, i.e., the nodes that are visible to the adversary and nodes that lead to the observation, and we
describe the probability to make an observation in terms of the core and all non-core nodes (Section 4.2).
Using these general concepts, we show the theorem separately for the three anonymity notions (Sections 4.3
to 4.5). Finally, we show that approximating the impacts via local maximization of the impacts is a sound
over-approximation (Section 4.6).
4.1 Overall Proof Outline
The proof of Theorem 2 follows the intuition of the proofs in [10], but requires less approximation for the
individual impacts of the nodes. By Theorem 1 and Lemma 22 from the full version of the AnoA framework
[9], it suffices to show that the ideal functionality of Tor, For′, is (δ, 1)-IND-ANO for δ = ImpactX(ABf ).
Once we showed this, we immediately obtain that Tor is (δ, 1)-IND-ANO for δ = ImpactX(A
B
f ) plus a
negligible additive factor, since Tor constitutes a UC-secure realization of For′. Roughly, For′ does not send
actual onion encryptions, but only provides handles over the network and thereby eliminates cryptographic
objects from the construction. For compromised nodes, For′ reveals which of these handles belong together.
By Lemma 1 we know that any observation made by any set of Tor nodes (in combination with senders and
recipients) N impacts anonymity by exactly ImpactobsX (N) for the anonymity notion αX under consideration.
Intuitively, the proof divides the set of all observations into distinct subsets of observations, depending on
where compromised nodes are located in a circuit. Then, for every such set, we compare the impact of each
observation if a set of Tor nodes (and the compromised recipient/sender) is compromised with the sum of
the impacts of all compromised Tor nodes (and the compromised sender/recipient) on their own. Since we
sum over all these Tor entities, for the majority of observations the impact of the sum is larger than the
impact of the combined set. However, the lack of observation of certain (compromised) nodes can increase
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the impact that other compromised nodes have on other compromised Tor entities. In the remainder of this
section, we will formally substantiate these claims.
A Simple Lemma. For our proofs we will need the following simple lemma.
Lemma 2 (Properties of φ). The function φ has the following properties:
(i) For all a, b, c, d ≥ 0, we have φ(a+ b, c+ d) ≤ φ(a, c) + φ(b, d).
(ii) For all a, b, c, d ≥ 0, we have φ(a− b, c− d) ≤ φ(a, c) + φ(d, b).
Proof. We show each property via a case distinction over the two cases of the conditional within φ.
(i) Let a, b, c, d. We distinguish two cases:
• Case 1: (a+ b) ≤ (c+ d). Then φ(a+ b, c+ d) = 0 ≤ 0 + 0 ≤ φ(a, c) + φ(b, d).
• Case 2: (a+ b) > (c+ d). Then
φ(a+ b, c+ d) = a+ b− (c+ d)
=a− c+ b− d ≤ φ(a, c) + φ(b, d),
since by definition φ(X,Y ) ≥ X − Y .
(ii) Let a, b, c, d ≥ 0. We distinguish two cases:
• Case 1: (a− b) ≤ (c− d). Then φ(a+ b, c+ d) = 0 ≤ 0 + 0 ≤ φ(a, c) + φ(d, b).
• Case 2: (a− b) > c− d. Then
φ(a− b, c− d) = a− b− (c− d) = a− c+ d− b
≤φ(a, c) + φ(b, d),
since by definition φ(X,Y ) ≥ X − Y .
Additional Notation for the Proof. In what follows, we write P ab[C] as a shortcut for
Pr [c ∈ C; c← ps(Sa,Rb)]. Moreover, we write P ab,cd[C] instead of 12
(
P ab[C] + P cd[C]
)
for the probabil-
ities we encounter when analyzing relationship anonymity. For an observation o = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5) we
refer to the element ni by writing o.ni. Recall that for any three Tor nodes ng ,nm ,nx we write P
ab
ng ,nm ,nx for
Pr [c = (Sa,ng ,nm ,nx ,Rb); ←¸ps(Sa,Rb)]. .
4.2 Visible Nodes, Observation Core and Blank Observations
We continue by defining natural observations and by then classifying them. For every (natural) observation
we define which elements are visible to the adversary. We will see that for every natural observation there is
one or more sets of core entities that have to be compromised in order to make the respective observation.
Along with these core entities we define for every observation which roles other Tor nodes have to play in
order to not invalidate the observation. To this end, we define blanked observations, i.e., observations that
only describe the type of the natural observation.
Definition 13 (Natural Observations; Visible Elements; Core Elements; Blanked Observations). We define
the set NatObs of natural observations as (S ×N ×{⊥}3)∪ (S ×N 2×{⊥}2)∪ ({⊥}×N 3×{⊥})∪ ({⊥}2×
N 2 ×R) ∪ ({⊥}3 ×N ×R) ∪ (S ×N 3 × {⊥}) ∪ ({⊥} ×N 3 ×R) ∪ (S ×N 3 ×R).
For every observation o = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5) ∈ Obs, we define the set of visible Tor entities V (o) as
V (o) := {ni | ni 6= ⊥, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}}.
For every natural observation o = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5) ∈ NatObs, we define the core element core(o) of o
as follows:
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• If o ∈ S ×N × {⊥}3, then core(o) := {{n1}}.
• If o ∈ S ×N 2 × {⊥}2 , then core(o) := {{n2}}.
• If o ∈ {⊥} ×N 3 × {⊥}, then core(o) := {{n3}}.
• If o ∈ {⊥}2 ×N 2 ×R, then core(o) := {{n4}}.
• If o ∈ {⊥}3 ×N ×R, then core(o) := {{n5}}.
• If o ∈ S ×N 3 × {⊥}, then core(o) := {{n1, n3}, {n2, n3}}.
• If o ∈ {⊥} ×N 3 ×R, then core(o) := {{n3, n4}, {n3, n5}}.
• If o ∈ S ×N 3 ×R, then core(o) := {{n1, n3, n5}, {n1, n4}, {n2, n4}, {n2, n5}}.
Naturally the core elements of an observation are always visible: For every natural observation o ∈ NatObs,
and for every Core ∈ core(o), we have Core ⊆ V (o).
For a natural observation o = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5) ∈ NatObs, we define the corresponding blanked ob-
servation blank(o) as blank(o) := (n′1, n
′
2, n
′
3, n
′
4, n
′
5) where n
′
i := ni if ni 6= ⊥ and n′i := otherwise for a
distinguished symbol . We extend the standard equality on observations o by treating as a placeholder: an
observation o = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5) is equal to a blank observation o
′ = (n′1, n
′
2, n
′
3, n
′
4, n
′
5) if ni = n
′
i for all
n′i 6= .
Definition 14 (Observation Circuits). Let N ⊆ N ∪S ∪R and o ∈ Obs be given. Then we define the set of
observation circuits OC(N, o) of N and o as OC(N, o) := {c ∈ C | o = O[N ](c)}. Similarly, we define the set
of blanked observation circuits OCblank(N, o) of N and o as OCblank(N, o) := {c ∈ C | blank(o) = O[N ](c)}.
We first show a basic lemma that states that an observation o by a set N can be made for a given circuit
precisely if for every element Core of the core of o, we have that (i) the same observation is made for this
circuit by Core and (ii) and the elements in N \Core make the corresponding blanked observation blank(o)
for this circuit.
Lemma 3 (Classification of Core). Let o ∈ NatObs be a natural observation, let Core ∈ core(o), and let
N ⊆ N ∪ S ∪R such that Core ⊆ N and let c ∈ C be a circuit. Then we have
O[N ](c) = o⇔ O[Core](c) = o ∧ O[N \ Core](c) = blank(o)
Proof. Let o ∈ NatObs be a natural observation, let Core ∈ core(o), and let N ⊆ N ∪ S ∪ R such that
Core ⊆ N and let c = (S,ng ,nm ,nx ,R) ∈ C be a circuit. We distinguish the following cases depending on
the structure of o.
• o ∈ S×N×{⊥}3. Then o = (S′,ng ′,⊥,⊥,⊥) for some S′ ∈ S,ng ′ ∈ N . By definition, core(o) =
{{
S′
}}
and thus Core =
{
S′
}
; since Core ⊆ N we have S′ ∈ N . By definition of O, we have
O[N ](c) = o⇔ S = S′ ∧ ng = ng ′ ∧ {ng ,nm ,nx ,Rb} ∩N = ∅
Moreover, we have
O[{S′}](c) = o⇔ S = S′ ∧ ng = ng ′
Since blank(o) = ( , ,⊥,⊥,⊥), we have
O[N \ {S′}](c) = blank(o)⇔ {ng ,nm ,nx ,R} ∩N = ∅
Thus, O[N ](c) = o⇔ O[Core](c) = o ∧ O[N \ Core](c) = blank(o).
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• o ∈ S × N 2 × {⊥}2. Then o = (S′,ng ′,nm ′,⊥,⊥) for some S′ ∈ S,ng ′,nm ′ ∈ N . By definition,
core(o) = {{ng ′}} and thus Core = {ng ′}; since Core ⊆ N we have ng ′ ∈ N . By definition of O, we
have
O[N ](c) = o⇔ S = S′ ∧ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ {nm ,nx ,R} ∩ (N \ {ng ′}) = ∅
Moreover, we have
O[{ng ′}](c) = o⇔ S = S′ ∧ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′
Since blank(o) = ( , , ,⊥,⊥), we have
O[N \ {ng ′}](c) = blank(o)⇔ {nm ,nx ,R} ∩ (N \ {ng ′}) = ∅
Thus, O[N ](c) = o⇔ O[Core](c) = o ∧ O[N \ Core](c) = blank(o).
• o ∈ {⊥} × N 3 × {⊥}. Then o = (⊥,ng ′,nm ′,nx ′,⊥) for some ng ′,nm ′,nx ′ ∈ N . By definition,
core(o) = {{nm ′}} and thus Core = {nm ′}; since Core ⊆ N we have nm ′ ∈ N . By definition of O, we
have
O[N ](c) = o⇔ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′ ∧ {S,ng ,nx ,R} ∩ (N \ {nm ′}) = ∅
Moreover, we have
O[{nm ′}](c) = o⇔ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′
Since blank(o) = (⊥, , , ,⊥), we have
O[N \ {nm ′}](c) = blank(o)⇔ {S,ng ,nx ,R} ∩ (N \ {nm ′}) = ∅
Thus, O[N ](c) = o⇔ O[Core](c) = o ∧ O[N \ Core](c) = blank(o).
• o ∈ {⊥}2 × N 2 × R. Then o = (⊥,⊥,nm ′,nx ′,R′) for some nm ′,nx ′ ∈ N ,R′ ∈ R. By definition,
core(o) = {{nx ′}} and thus Core = {nx ′}; since Core ⊆ N we have nx ′ ∈ N . By definition of O, we
have
O[N ](c) = o⇔ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′ ∧R = R′ ∧ {S,ng ,nm} ∩ (N \ {nx ′}) = ∅
Moreover, we have
O[{nx ′}](c) = o⇔ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′ ∧R = R′
Since blank(o) = (⊥,⊥, , , ), we have
O[N \ {nx ′}](c) = blank(o)⇔ {S,ng ,nm} ∩ (N \ {nx ′}) = ∅
Thus, O[N ](c) = o⇔ O[Core](c) = o ∧ O[N \ Core](c) = blank(o).
• o ∈ {⊥}3 × N × R. Then o = (⊥,⊥,⊥,nx ′,R′) for some nx ′ ∈ N ,R′ ∈ R. By definition, core(o) ={{
R′
}}
and thus Core =
{
R′
}
and since Core ⊆ N we have R′ ∈ N . By definition of O, we have
O[N ](c) = o⇔ nx = nx ′ ∧R = R′ ∧ {S,ng ,nm ,nx} ∩N = ∅
Moreover, we have
O[{R′}](c) = o⇔ nx = nx ′ ∧R = R′
Since blank(o) = (⊥,⊥,⊥, , ), we have
O[N \ {R′}](c) = blank(o)⇔ {S,ng ,nm ,nx} ∩N = ∅
Thus, O[N ](c) = o⇔ O[Core](c) = o ∧ O[N \ Core](c) = blank(o).
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• o ∈ S × N 3 × {⊥}. Then o = (S′,ng ′,nm ′,nx ′,⊥) for some S′ ∈ S,ng ′,nm ′,nx ′ ∈ N . By definition,
core(o) =
{{ng ′,nm ′} ,{S′,nm ′}}. We distinguish the following two cases, depending on Core.
Case Core = {ng ′,nm ′}: Since Core ⊆ N we have ng ′,nm ′ ∈ N . By definition of O, we have
O[N ](c) = o⇔ S = S′ ∧ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′ ∧ {nx ,R} ∩ (N \ {ng ′,nm ′}) = ∅
Moreover, we have
O[{ng ′,nm ′}](c) = o⇔ S = S′ ∧ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′
Since blank(o) = ( , , , ,⊥), we have
O[N \ {ng ′,nm ′}](c) = blank(o)⇔ {nx ,R} ∩ (N \ {ng ′,nm ′}) = ∅
Thus, O[N ](c) = o⇔ O[Core](c) = o ∧ O[N \ Core](c) = blank(o).
Case Core =
{
S′,nm ′
}
: Since Core ⊆ N we have S′,nm ′ ∈ N . By definition of O, we have
O[N ](c) = o⇔ S = S′ ∧ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′ ∧ {nx ,R} ∩ (N \ {S,nm ′}) = ∅
Moreover, we have
O[{S′,nm ′}](c) = o⇔ S = S′ ∧ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′
Since blank(o) = ( , , , ,⊥), we have
O[N \ {S′,nm ′}](c) = blank(o)⇔ {nx ,R} ∩ (N \ {S,nm ′}) = ∅
Thus, O[N ](c) = o⇔ O[Core](c) = o ∧ O[N \ Core](c) = blank(o).
• o ∈ {⊥} × N 3 ×R. Then o = (⊥,ng ′,nm ′,nx ′,R′) for some ng ′,nm ′,nx ′ ∈ N ,R′ ∈ R. By definition,
core(o) =
{{nm ′,nx ′} ,{nm ′,R′}}. We distinguish the following two cases, depending on Core.
Case Core = {nm ′,nx ′}: Since Core ⊆ N we have nm ′,nx ′ ∈ N . By definition of O, we have
O[N ](c) = o⇔ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′ ∧R = R′ ∧ {S,ng} ∩ (N \ {nm ′,nx ′}) = ∅
Moreover, we have
O[{nm ′,nx ′}](c) = o⇔ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′ ∧R = R′
Since blank(o) = (⊥, , , , ), we have
O[N \ {nm ′,nx ′}](c) = blank(o)⇔ {S,ng} ∩ (N \ {nm ′,nx ′}) = ∅
Thus, O[N ](c) = o⇔ O[Core](c) = o ∧ O[N \ Core](c) = blank(o).
Case Core =
{
nm
′,R′
}
: Since Core ⊆ N we have nm ′,R′ ∈ N . By definition of O, we have
O[N ](c) = o⇔ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′ ∧R = R′ ∧ {S,ng} ∩ (N \ {nm ′,R}) = ∅
Moreover, we have
O[{nm ′,R′}](c) = o⇔ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′ ∧R = R′
Since blank(o) = (⊥, , , , ), we have
O[N \ {nm ′,R′}](c) = blank(o)⇔ {S,ng} ∩ (N \ {nm ′,R}) = ∅
Thus, O[N ](c) = o⇔ O[Core](c) = o ∧ O[N \ Core](c) = blank(o).
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• o ∈ S × N 3 × R. Then o = (S′,ng ′,nm ′,nx ′,R′) for some ng ′,nm ′,nx ′ ∈ N ,S′ ∈ S,R′ ∈ R. By
definition, core(o) =
{{
S′,nm ′,R′
}
,
{
S′,nx ′
}
, {ng ′,nx ′} ,
{
ng
′,R′
}}
. By definition of O we have
O[N ](c) = o⇔ S = S′ ∧ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′ ∧R = R′
Equally, for every element Core ∈ core(o) we have
O[Core](c) = o⇔ S = S′ ∧ ng = ng ′ ∧ nm = nm ′ ∧ nx = nx ′ ∧R = R′
Moreover, since blank(o) = ( , , , , ), for every observation o′ ∈ Obs we have o′ = blank(o) and thus,
O[N ](c) = o⇔ O[Core](c) = o ∧ O[N \ Core](c) = blank(o).
With this lemma in place, we can state and prove a lemma about the impact of compromised nodes
on a certain observation. It states that the probability of making a certain observation by means of a set
N of nodes can be computed by the probability that the core of this observation already suffices to make
this observation, under the assumption that the remaining nodes (outside this core) make the corresponding
blanked observation. Intuitively, this means that the core is sufficient for making the observation, and that
the remaining nodes can only infer ⊥ for those elements of the information that cannot be observed.
Lemma 4 (Impact of Compromised Nodes). Let Sa ∈ S be a sender and Rb ∈ R be a recipient. Let
o ∈ NatObs be a natural observation, Core ∈ core(o), and N ⊆ N ∪ S ∪ R such that Core ⊆ N . Then we
have
P ab[OC(N, o)] = P ab[OC(Core, o) ∩ OCblank(N \ Core, o)].
Proof. We have
P ab[OC(N, o)] = Pr [c ∈ OC(N, o); c← ps(Sa,Rb)] = Pr [O[N ](c) = o; c← ps(Sa,Rb)]
= Pr [O[Core](c) = o ∧ O[N \ {Core}](c) = blank(o); c← ps(Sa,Rb)]
= Pr [c ∈ OC(Core, o) ∩ OCblank(N \ Core, o); c← ps(Sa,Rb)]
= P ab[OC(Core, o) ∩ OCblank(N \ Core, o)],
where the fourth equality follows from Lemma 3; the remaining equalities hold by definition of P ab and
OC.
For any given observation, more than the core of the observation is visible to the adversary. We now
analyze the impact that compromising any such visible Tor entity may have on the impact of an observation,
if the entity is not already contained in the core of the observation.
We show that such entries can be of two types: (i) entities that are superfluous, i.e., compromising them
does not change the impact of the observation, and (ii) entities that are destructive, i.e., compromising them
makes the observation impossible and thus completely removes the impact of an observation. We combine
these insights in the following lemma, where we show that ignoring all visible entities except for the core can
only increase the impact of an observation.
Lemma 5 (Impact of Visible Non-core Nodes). Let Sa,Sc ∈ S be two senders and Rb,Rd ∈ R be two
recipients. Let o ∈ NatObs be a natural observation, Core ∈ core(o), and N ⊆ N ∪ S ∪ R such that
Core ⊆ N . Then, for NV = N \ (V (o) \ Core),
φ
(
P ab[OC(N, o)], P cd[OC(N, o)]) ≤ φ (P ab[OC(NV , o)], P cd[OC(NV , o)])
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Proof. Let Sa,Sc ∈ S be two senders and Rb,Rd ∈ R be two recipients. Let o ∈ NatObs be a natural
observation, Core ∈ core(o), and N ⊆ N ∪ S ∪R such that Core ⊆ N , and let NV = N \ (V (o) \ Core). By
Lemma 3 we know that OC(N, o) ⊆ OC(Core, o).
Let x ∈ V (o)\Core be any visible Tor entity of the observation that does not belong to the core. We show
that we can remove x from N without reducing the impact. If x /∈ N , φ (P ab[OC(N, o)], P cd[OC(N, o)]) =
φ
(
P ab[OC(N \ {x} , o)], P cd[OC(N \ {x} , o)]) trivially holds.
If x ∈ N , we distinguish two cases:
• There is a circuit c ∈ OC(Core, o) s.t. c /∈ OCblank({x} , o). By Definition 3 we know that x cannot
occur in c twice with non-zero probability, so the position in which x is observed must lead to an
observation that is incompatible with blank(o). However, by definition of OC(Core, o) and V , for every
other circuit c′ ∈ OC(Core, o), x is in the same position, which leads to an observation of the same
form and thus c′ /∈ OCblank({x} , o)] must also hold. Consequently,
φ
(
P ab[OC(N, o)], P cd[OC(N, o)])
= φ
(
P ab[OC(Core, o) ∩ OCblank(N \ Core, o)], P cd[OC(Core, o) ∩ OCblank(N \ Core, o)]
)
= φ
(
P ab[∅], P cd[∅])
= φ (0, 0)
≤ φ (P ab[OC(N \ {x} , o)], P cd[OC(N \ {x} , o)])
• Otherwise, we have OC(Core, o) ⊆ OCblank({x} , o)] and thus, φ
(
P ab[OC(N, o)], P cd[OC(N, o)]) =
φ
(
P ab[OC(N \ {x} , o)], P cd[OC(N \ {x} , o)])
Applying this reasoning for every such element x ∈ V (o) \ Core concludes the proof.
4.3 Proof for Sender Anonymity
We now combine the results for indirect impacts and derive our bound for sender anonymity. To this end,
we first show that for any given set of compromised Tor nodes we can derive a bound according to our
definitions for indirect impact.
Lemma 6 (Observations for Sender Anonymity). Let S0,S1 ∈ S be two senders and R0 ∈ R be a recipient,
and let N = N ′ ∪ {R0} be a set of compromised Tor entities with N ′ ⊆ N being a set of compromised Tor
nodes. Then we have
∑
o∈Obs
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
≤ ImpactobsSA (R0) +
∑
n∈N ′
(
ImpactobsSA (n) + ImpactRec1(n)
+
∑
n′∈N ′\{n}
(
Impact
(10),(00)
indirect (n,n
′) + ImpactRec2(n,n
′)
)
Proof. We define the following sets of observations for sender anonymity:
• Obsg,SA := {(n1, . . . , n5) ∈ Obs s.t. n1 6= ⊥},
• Obsm,SA := {(n1, . . . , n5) ∈ Obs \Obsg,SA s.t. n2 6= ⊥},
• Obsx,SA := {(n1, . . . , n5) ∈ Obs \ (Obsg,SA ∪Obsm,SA) s.t. n3 6= ⊥},
• ObsR,SA := Obs \ (Obsg,SA ∪Obsm,SA ∪Obsx,SA).
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As these sets define a partitioning of Obs, we get∑
o∈Obs
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
=
∑
o∈Obsg,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])+ ∑
o∈Obsm,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
+
∑
o∈Obsx,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])+ ∑
o∈ObsR,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
We now consider each of the sets of observations individually.
• Obsg,SA. We first show that (in addition to R0) a compromised guard node is required and sufficient
for making an observation in Obsg,SA and that additionally compromised nodes do not contribute to
the impact of such observations. Let c = (Sa,ng ,nm ,nx ,R0) ∈ C be any circuit with Sa ∈ {S0,S1}
s.t. o = O[N ](c) ∈ Obsg,SA is the observation made by the adversary for this circuit. By definition
of Obsg,SA, Sa is part of the observation. Since {S0,S1} ∩ N = ∅, we know that ng ∈ N is required
to make the observation. Since ng ∈ N is also sufficient to observe the sender we get P 00[OC(N ∪
{R0} , o)] = 0 or P 10[OC(N ∪ {R0} , o)] = 0. By definition of φ we know that for these observations
φ
(
P 00[OC(N ∪ {R0} , o)], P 10[OC(N ∪ {R0} , o)]
)
= P 00[OC(N ∪ {R0} , o)]. Thus,∑
o∈Obsg,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N ∪ {R0} , o)], P 10[OC(N ∪ {R0} , o)]
)
=
∑
o∈Obsg,SA
P 00[OC(N ∪ {R0} , o)]
=
∑
ng∈N
nm ,nx∈N
Pr [c = (S0,ng ,nm ,nx ,R0), c← ps(S0,R0)]
=
∑
ng∈N
∑
o∈Obsg,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC({ng} , o)], P 10[OC({ng} , o)]
)
.
• Obsm,SA. We first show that (in addition to R0) a compromised middle node is required and sufficient
for making an observation in Obsm,SA. We then argue that we can remove the recipient from the
computation without modifying the probability and, finally, that additionally compromised nodes do
not contribute to the impact of such observations. Let c = (Sa,ng ,nm ,nx ,R0) ∈ C be any circuit with
Sa ∈ {S0,S1} s.t. o = O[N ](c) ∈ Obsm,SA is the observation made by the adversary for this circuit.
We have core(o) = {{nm ,nx} , {nm ,R0}} and set Core = {nm ,R0}. By Lemma 5 we know that
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)]) ≤ φ (P 00[OC(N \ {ng ,nx} , o)], P 10[OC(N \ {ng ,nx} , o)])
All nodes of the circuit are visible in the observation. Since all nodes in N \ V (o) can thus never
lead to the observation o and consequently, compromising them does not modify the probability of the
observation, we know that
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)]) ≤ φ (P 00[OC({nm ,R0} , o)], P 10[OC({nm ,R0} , o)])
Moreover, we know that O[{nm ,R0}](c) = (⊥,ng ,nm ,nx ,R0), and O[{nm}](c) = (⊥,ng ,nm ,nx ,⊥) =:
o′. Since there is only one recipient and since this holds for all respective circuits,
P a0[OC({nm ,R0} , o)] = P a0[OC({nm} , o′)], and, consequently,∑
o∈Obsm,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)]) ≤ ∑
o∈Obsm,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC({nm} , o)], P 10[OC({nm} , o)]
)
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• Obsx,SA. All observations o ∈ Obsx,SA are of the form (⊥,⊥,nm ,nx ,R0) and we have core(o) = {{nx}}
and V (o) = {nm ,nx ,R0}. By Lemma 5 we know that∑
o∈Obsx,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
≤
∑
o∈Obsx,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N \ {nm ,R0} , o)], P 10[OC(N \ {nm ,R0} , o)]
)
.
If nx /∈ N then φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)]) = φ (0, 0) = 0.
Otherwise, we rewrite the probability according to Lemma 4 and get
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
≤ φ (P 00[OC({nx} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ V (o), o)], P 10[OC({nx} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ V (o), o)])
= φ
 ∑
ng∈N\N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N\N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx

= φ
∑
ng∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx −
∑
ng∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx −
∑
ng∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx

≤ φ
∑
ng∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx
+ φ
∑
ng∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx

= φ
(
P 00[OC({nx} , o)], P 10[OC({nx} , o)]
)
+ φ
∑
ng∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx
 .
Thus, if we sum over all observations o ∈ Obsx,SA we get∑
o∈Obsx,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
≤
∑
o∈Obsx,SA
(
φ
(
P 00[OC({o.n4} , o)], P 10[OC({o.n4} , o)]
)
+φ
∑
ng∈N
P 1,0ng ,o.n3,o.n4 ,
∑
ng∈N
P 0,0ng ,o.n3,o.n4

=
∑
nx∈N
∑
o∈Obsx,SA
(
φ
(
P 00[OC({nx} , o)], P 10[OC({nx} , o)]
))
+
∑
nx∈N
∑
nm∈N
φ
∑
ng∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx

≤
∑
nx∈N
∑
o∈Obsx,SA
(
φ
(
P 00[OC({nx} , o)], P 10[OC({nx} , o)]
))
+
∑
ng∈N
nx∈N
Impact
(10),(00)
indirect (ng ,nx ) .
• ObsR,SA. Let o = (⊥,⊥,⊥,nx ,R0) be any observation in ObsR,SA. Since core(o) = {{R0}} we have
Core = {R0}. By Lemma 5 we know that
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
24
≤ φ (P 00[OC(N \ {nx} , o)], P 10[OC(N \ {nx} , o)])
We rewrite the probability according to Lemma 4 and yield
φ
(
P 00[OC(N \ {nx} , o)], P 10[OC(N \ {nx} , o)]
)
= φ
(
P 00[OC(Core, o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {nx ,R0} , o)], P 10[OC(Core, o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {nx ,R0} , o)]
)
= φ
 ∑
ng∈N\N
nm∈N\N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N\N
nm∈N\N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx ,

= φ
 ∑
ng∈N
nm∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx −
∑
n∈N
n′∈N
(
P 0,0n,n′,nx + P
0,0
n′,n,nx
)
+
∑
ng∈N
nm∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
nm∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx −
∑
n∈N
n′∈N
(
P 1,0n,n′,nx + P
1,0
n′,n,nx
)
+
∑
ng∈N
nm∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx

≤ φ
 ∑
ng∈N
nm∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
nm∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx

+φ
∑
n∈N
n′∈N
(
P 1,0n,n′,nx + P
1,0
n′,n,nx
)
,
∑
n∈N
n′∈N
(
P 0,0n,n′,nx + P
0,0
n′,n,nx
)
+φ
 ∑
ng∈N
nm∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
nm∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx

≤ φ (P 00[OC({R0} , o)], P 10[OC({R0} , o)])
+
∑
n∈N
φ
∑
n′∈N
(
P 1,0n,n′,nx + P
1,0
n′,n,nx
)
,
∑
n′∈N
(
P 0,0n,n′,nx + P
0,0
n′,n,nx
)
+
∑
ng∈N
nm∈N
φ
(
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx , P
1,0
ng ,nm ,nx
)
We combine these individual bounds for the sets of observations and yield∑
o∈Obs
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
=
∑
o∈Obsg,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])+ ∑
o∈Obsm,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
+
∑
o∈Obsx,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])+ ∑
o∈ObsR,SA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
≤
∑
o∈Obsg,SA
∑
ng∈N ′
φ
(
P 00[OC({ng} , o)], P 10[OC({ng} , o)]
)
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+
∑
o∈Obsm,SA
∑
nm∈N ′
φ
(
P 00[OC({nm} , o)], P 10[OC({nm} , o)]
)
+
∑
o∈Obsx,SA
∑
nx∈N ′
φ
(
P 00[OC({nx} , o)], P 10[OC({nx} , o)]
)
+
∑
ng∈N ′
nx∈N ′
(
Impact
(10),(00)
indirect (ng ,nx )
)
+
∑
o∈ObsR,SA
(n1,n2,n3,n4,n5):=o
(
φ
(
P 00[OC({R0} , o)], P 10[OC({R0} , o)]
)
+
∑
n∈N ′
φ
∑
n′∈N
(
P 1,0n,n′,n4 + P
1,0
n′,n,n4
)
,
∑
n′∈N
(
P 0,0n,n′,n4 + P
0,0
n′,n,n4
)
+
∑
ng∈N ′
nm∈N ′
φ
(
P 0,0ng ,nm ,n4 , P
1,0
ng ,nm ,n4
))
≤
∑
n∈N ′
 ∑
o∈Obs 6⊥
φ
(
P 00[OC({n} , o)], P 10[OC({n} , o)])+ ∑
n′∈N ′
Impact
(10),(00)
indirect (n,n
′)
+ ImpactRec1(n) +
∑
n′∈N ′
ImpactRec2(n,n
′)
)
+
∑
o∈Obs 6⊥
φ
(
P 00[OC({R0} , o)], P 10[OC({R0} , o)]
)
= ImpactobsSA (R0) +
∑
n∈N ′
(
ImpactobsSA (n) + ImpactRec1(n)
+
∑
n′∈N ′\{n}
(
Impact
(10),(00)
indirect (n,n
′) + ImpactRec2(n,n
′)
)
The last equation holds because for all n ∈ N , Impact(ab),(cd)indirect (n,n) = 0, since all probabilities of circuits
are zero if the same node is used more than once in the same circuit.
4.4 Proof for Recipient Anonymity
We now derive our bound for recipient anonymity. Both the lemma and the proof are completely analogous
to the case of sender anonymity.
Lemma 7 (Observations for Recipient Anonymity). Let S0 ∈ S be a sender and R0,R1 ∈ R be two
recipients, and let N = N ′ ∪ {S0} be a set of compromised Tor entities with N ′ ⊆ N being a set of
compromised Tor nodes. Then we have
∑
o∈Obs
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 01[OC(N, o)])
≤ ImpactobsRA(S0) +
∑
n∈N ′
(
ImpactobsRA(n) + ImpactSen1(n)
+
∑
n′∈N ′\{n}
(
Impact
(01),(00)
indirect (n,n
′) + ImpactSen2(n,n
′)
)
Proof. We define the following sets of observations for recipient anonymity:
• Obsx,RA := {(n1, . . . , n5) ∈ Obs s.t. n5 6= ⊥},
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• Obsm,RA := {(n1, . . . , n5) ∈ Obs \Obsx,RA s.t. n4 6= ⊥},
• Obsg,RA := {(n1, . . . , n5) ∈ Obs \ (Obsx,RA ∪Obsm,RA) s.t. n3 6= ⊥},
• ObsS,RA := Obs \ (Obsx,RA ∪Obsm,RA ∪Obsg,RA).
As these sets define a partitioning of Obs, we get∑
o∈Obs
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 01[OC(N, o)])
=
∑
o∈Obsx,RA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 01[OC(N, o)])+ ∑
o∈Obsm,RA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 01[OC(N, o)])
+
∑
o∈Obsg,RA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 01[OC(N, o)])+ ∑
o∈ObsS,RA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 01[OC(N, o)])
The rest of the proof is completely analogous to the proof for Lemma 6. To give some intuition into the
proof, we describe which parts of this proof correspond to which parts of the proof for Lemma 6.
• Obsx,RA corresponds to Obsg,SA in Lemma 6.
• Obsm,RA corresponds to Obsm,SA in Lemma 6.
• Obsg,RA corresponds to Obsx,SA in Lemma 6.
• ObsS,RA corresponds to ObsR,SA in Lemma 6.
We combine these bounds and yield
ImpactobsRA(N)
=
∑
o∈Obs
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
=
∑
o∈Obsx,RA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
+
∑
o∈Obsm,RA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
+
∑
o∈Obsg,RA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
+
∑
o∈ObsS,RA
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
≤
∑
o∈Obsx,RA
∑
nx∈N ′
φ
(
P 00[OC({nx} , )o], P 01[OC({nx} , o)]
)
+
∑
o∈Obsm,RA
∑
nm∈N ′
φ
(
P 00[OC({nm} , o)], P 01[OC({nm} , o)]
)
+
∑
o∈Obsg,RA
 ∑
ng∈N ′
φ
(
P 00[OC({ng} , o)], P 01[OC({ng} , o)]
)+ ∑
ng∈N ′
nx∈N ′
(
Impact
(01),(00)
indirect (ng ,nx )
)
+
∑
o∈ObsS,RA
(n1,n2,n3,n4,n5):=o
(
φ
(
P 00[OC({S0} , o)], P 01[OC({S0} , o)]
)
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+
∑
n∈N ′
φ
∑
n′∈N
(
P 0,1n2,n,n′ + P
0,1
n2,n′,n
)
,
∑
n′∈N
(
P 0,0n2,n,n′ + P
0,0
n2,n′,n
)
+
∑
nm∈N ′
nx∈N ′
φ
(
P 0,0n2,nm ,nx , P
0,1
n2,nm ,nx
))
≤
∑
n∈N ′
ImpactobsRA(n) + ∑
n′∈N ′
Impact
(01),(00)
indirect (n,n
′)
+ ImpactSen1(n) +
∑
n′∈N ′
ImpactSen2(n,n
′)
)
+
∑
o∈Obs 6⊥
φ
(
P 00[OC({S0} , o)], P 01[OC({S0} , o)]
)
= ImpactobsRA(S0) +
∑
n∈N ′
(
ImpactobsRA(n) + ImpactSen1(n)
+
∑
n′∈N ′\{n}
(
Impact
(01),(00)
indirect (n,n
′) + ImpactSen2(n,n
′)
)
The last equation holds because for all n ∈ N , Impact(ab),(cd)indirect (n,n) = 0, since all probabilities of circuits
are zero if the same node is used more than once in the same circuit.
4.5 Proof for Relationship Anonymity
We combine the results for indirect impacts and derive our bound for relationship anonymity. In contrast to
sender anonymity and relationship anonymity, two aspects are different for relationship anonymity: (i) for
relationship anonymity, N contains neither a sender nor a recipient from the challenge message, and (ii) for
relationship anonymity we have to consider four distributions over circuits instead of two distributions over
circuits. Recall that we write P ab,cd[C] instead of 12
(
P ab[C] + P cd[C]
)
.
Lemma 8 (Observations for Relationship Anonymity). Let S0,S1 be two senders and R0,R1 be
two recipients, and let N ⊆ N be a set of compromised Tor nodes. Under the assumption that
P 00,11[OC(N, (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥))] ≤ P 01,10[OC(N, (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥))]
∑
o∈Obs
φ
(
P 00,11[CO(N, o)], P 01,10[CO(N, o)])
≤
∑
n∈N
ImpactobsREL({n}) + ∑
n′∈N
(
Impactobs−2REL ({n,n ′})
)
+
∑
n′∈N
(
1
2
Impact
(01),(00)
indirect (n,n
′) +
1
2
Impact
(10),(11)
indirect (n,n
′)
+
1
2
Impact
(10),(00)
indirect (n
′,n) +
1
2
Impact
(01),(11)
indirect (n
′,n)
))
Proof. We define the following sets of observations for relationship anonymity, where each set is indexed by
the positions of the compromised nodes that make the respective observations:
• Obsgx,REL := {(n1, . . . , n5) ∈ Obs s.t. (n1 6= ⊥ ∧ n5 6= ⊥)},
• Obsgm,REL := {(n1, . . . , n5) ∈ Obs \Obst s.t. n1 6= ⊥ ∧ n4 6= ⊥},
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• Obsmx,REL := {(n1, . . . , n5) ∈ Obs \Obst s.t. n2 6= ⊥ ∧ n5 6= ⊥},
• Obsm,REL := {(n1, . . . , n5) ∈ Obs \ (Obst ∪Obsgm,REL ∪Obsmx,REL) s.t. n2 6= ⊥ ∧ n4 6= ⊥},
• Obsg,REL := {(n1, . . . , n5) ∈ Obs \ (Obst ∪Obsgm,REL ∪Obsmx,REL ∪Obsm,REL) s.t. n2 6= ⊥},
• Obsx,REL := {(n1, . . . , n5) ∈ Obs \ (Obst ∪Obsgm,REL ∪Obsmx,REL ∪Obsm,REL) s.t. n4 6= ⊥},
• Obsr,REL := Obs \ (Obst ∪ Obsgm,REL ∪ Obsmx,REL ∪ Obsm,REL ∪ Obsg,REL ∪ Obsx,REL) =
{(⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥)}.
We now consider each of the sets of observations individually.
• Obsgx,REL. Since neither the sender nor the recipient can be compromised for relationship anonymity,
each observation in this set is of the form o = (Sa,ng ,nm ,nx ,Rb) and we either have ng ,nx ∈ N , or
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)]) = φ(0, 0) = 0. Since {ng ,nx} ∈ core(o), by Lemma 5 and by the
fact that the observation can only be made by the nodes ng ,nm ,nx that belong to the circuit we get
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)]) ≤ φ (P 00,11[OC({ng ,nx} , o)], P 01,10[OC({ng ,nx} , o)])
• Obsgm,REL. Each observation in this set is of the form o = (Sa,ng ,nm ,nx ,⊥) and we have core(o) =
{{Sa,nm} , {ng ,nm}}. Since Sa /∈ N for relationship anonymity, we assume Core = {ng ,nm} ⊆ N
to make this observation, as otherwise φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)]) = φ(0, 0) = 0. Since
{ng ,nm} ∈ core(o), by Lemma 5 and by the fact that the observation can only be made by
the nodes ng ,nm ,nx that belong to the circuit we get φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)]) ≤
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({ng ,nm} , o)], P 01,10[OC({ng ,nm} , o)]
)
.
• Obsmx,REL. Analogously to the previous case, each observation in this set is of the form o =
(⊥,ng ,nm ,nx ,Rb) and we have core(o) = {{nm ,nx} , {nm ,Rb}}. Since Rb /∈ N for relation-
ship anonymity, we assume Core = {nm ,nx} ⊆ N to make this observation, as otherwise
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)]) = φ(0, 0) = 0. Since {nm ,nx} ∈ core(o), by Lemma 5 and
by the fact that the observation can only be made by the nodes ng ,nm ,nx that belong to the circuit
we get φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)]) ≤ φ (P 00,11[OC({nm ,nx} , o)], P 01,10[OC({nm ,nx} , o)]).
• Obsm. Each observation in this set is of the form o = (⊥,ng ,nm ,nx ,⊥) and we have
core(o) = {{nm}}. We assume Core = {nm} ⊆ N to make this observation, as otherwise
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)]) = φ(0, 0) = 0. Since {nm} ∈ core(o), by Lemma 5 and by
the fact that the observation can only be made by the nodes ng ,nm ,nx that belong to the circuit we
get φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)]) ≤ φ (P 00,11[OC({nm} , o)], P 01,10[OC({nm} , o)]).
• Obsg,REL. Each observation in this set is of the form o = (Sa,ng ,nm ,⊥,⊥) and we have
core(o) = {{ng}}. We assume Core = {ng} ⊆ N to make this observation, as otherwise
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)]) = φ(0, 0) = 0. Since {ng} ∈ core(o), by Lemmas 4 and 5 we
get
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)])
≤ φ (P 00,11[OC(N \ {nm} , o)], P 01,10[OC(N \ {nm} , o)])
= φ
(
P 00,11[OC({ng} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {ng ,nm} , o)],
P 01,10[OC({ng} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {ng ,nm} , o)]
)
We now distinguish two cases depending on the sender Sa:
– Case Sa = S0. Then
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({ng} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {ng ,nm} , o)],
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P 01,10[OC({ng} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {ng ,nm} , o)]
)
=
1
2
φ
 ∑
nx∈N\N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
nx∈N\N
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx

=
1
2
φ
( ∑
nx∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx −
∑
nx∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
nx∈N
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx −
∑
nx∈N
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx
)
≤ 1
2
φ
( ∑
nx∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
nx∈N
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx
)
+
1
2
φ
(∑
nx∈N
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
nx∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx
)
≤ φ (P 00,11[OC({ng} , o)], P 01,10[OC({ng} , o)])+ 1
2
∑
nx∈N
φ
(
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx , P
0,0
ng ,nm ,nx
)
– Case Sa = S1. Then
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({ng} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {ng ,nm} , o)],
P 01,10[OC({ng} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {ng ,nm} , o)]
)
=
1
2
φ
 ∑
nx∈N\N
P 1,1ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
nx∈N\N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx

=
1
2
φ
( ∑
nx∈N
P 1,1ng ,nm ,nx −
∑
nx∈N
P 1,1ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
nx∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx −
∑
nx∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx
)
≤ 1
2
φ
( ∑
nx∈N
P 1,1ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
nx∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx
)
+
1
2
φ
(∑
nx∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
nx∈N
P 1,1ng ,nm ,nx
)
≤ φ (P 00,11[OC({ng} , o)], P 01,10[OC({ng} , o)])+ 1
2
∑
nx∈N
φ
(
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx , P
1,1
ng ,nm ,nx
)
Thus, overall we get ∑
o∈Obsg,REL
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)])
≤
∑
o∈Obsg,REL
(n1,n2,n3,n4,n5):=o
∑
ng∈N
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({ng} , o)], P 01,10[OC({ng} , o)]
)
+
1
2
∑
nx∈N
φ
(
P 0,1n2,n3,nx , P
0,0
n2,n3,nx
)
+
1
2
∑
nx∈N
φ
(
P 1,0n2,n3,nx , P
1,1
n2,n3,nx
))
≤
∑
ng∈N
∑
o∈Obsg,REL
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({ng} , o)], P 01,10[OC({ng} , o)]
)
+
1
2
∑
ng∈N
nm∈N
nx∈N
φ
(
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx , P
0,0
ng ,nm ,nx
)
+
1
2
∑
ng∈N
nm∈N
nx∈N
φ
(
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx , P
1,1
ng ,nm ,nx
)
=
∑
ng∈N
∑
o∈Obsg,REL
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({ng} , o)], P 01,10[OC({ng} , o)]
)
+
1
2
∑
ng∈N
nx∈N
Impact
(01)(00)
indirect (ng ,nx ) +
1
2
∑
ng∈N
nx∈N
Impact
(10)(11)
indirect (ng ,nx ) .
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• Obsx,REL. Each observation in this set is of the form o = (⊥,⊥,nm ,nx ,Rb) and we have core(o) =
{{nx}}. We assume Core = {nx} ⊆ N , as otherwise φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)]) = φ(0, 0) =
0. Since {nx} ∈ core(o), by Lemmas 4 and 5 we get
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)])
≤ φ (P 00,11[OC(N \ {nm} , o)], P 01,10[OC(N \ {nm} , o)])
= φ
(
P 00,11[OC({nx} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {nx ,nm} , o)], P 01,10[OC({nx} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {nx ,nm} , o)]
)
We now distinguish two cases depending on the recipient Rb:
– Case Rb = R0. Then
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({nx} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {nx ,nm} , o)],
P 01,10[OC({nx} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {nx ,nm} , o)]
)
=
1
2
φ
 ∑
ng∈N\N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N\N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx

=
1
2
φ
∑
ng∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx −
∑
ng∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx −
∑
ng∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx

≤ 1
2
φ
∑
ng∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx
+ 1
2
φ
∑
ng∈N
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
P 0,0ng ,nm ,nx

≤ φ (P 00,11[OC({nx} , o)], P 01,10[OC({nx} , o)])+ 1
2
∑
ng∈N
φ
(
P 1,0ng ,nm ,nx , P
0,0
ng ,nm ,nx
)
– Case Rb = R1. Then
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({nx} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {nx ,nm} , o)],
P 01,10[OC({nx} , o) ∩ OCblank(N \ {nx ,nm} , o)]
)
=
1
2
φ
 ∑
ng∈N\N
P 1,1ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N\N
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx

=
1
2
φ
∑
ng∈N
P 1,1ng ,nm ,nx −
∑
ng∈N
P 1,1ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx −
∑
ng∈N
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx

≤ 1
2
φ
∑
ng∈N
P 1,1ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx
+ 1
2
φ
∑
ng∈N
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx ,
∑
ng∈N
P 1,1ng ,nm ,nx

≤ φ (P 00,11[OC({nx} , o)], P 01,10[OC({nx} , o)])+ 1
2
∑
ng∈N
φ
(
P 0,1ng ,nm ,nx , P
1,1
ng ,nm ,nx
)
Thus, overall we get (analogously to the case for Obsg,REL)∑
o∈Obsx,REL
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)])
≤
∑
nx∈N
∑
o∈Obsx,REL
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({nx} , o)], P 01,10[OC({nx} , o)]
)
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+
1
2
∑
ng∈N
nx∈N
Impact
(10)(00)
indirect (ng ,nx ) +
1
2
∑
ng∈N
nx∈N
Impact
(01)(11)
indirect (ng ,nx ) .
• Obsr,REL. This set only contains the observation or = (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥) and by
assumption P 00,11[OC(N, (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥))] ≤ P 01,10[OC(N, (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥))]. Thus,
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)]) = 0.
As these sets define a partitioning of Obs, we get∑
o∈Obs
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)])
=
∑
o∈Obsgx,REL
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)])+ ∑
o∈Obsgm,REL
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)])
+
∑
o∈Obsmx,REL
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)])+ ∑
o∈Obsm
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)])
+
∑
o∈Obsg
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)])+ ∑
o∈Obsx
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)])
+
∑
o∈Obsr
φ
(
P 00,11[OC(N, o)], P 01,10[OC(N, o)])
≤
∑
n∈N
n′∈N
 ∑
o∈Obsgx,REL∪Obsgm,REL∪Obsmx,REL
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({n,n ′} , o)], P 01,10[OC({n,n ′} , o)])

+
∑
n∈N
( ∑
o∈Obsm
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({n} , o)], P 01,10[OC({n} , o)])
+
∑
o∈Obsg
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({n} , o)], P 01,10[OC({n} , o)])
+
1
2
∑
nx∈N
Impact
(01),(00)
indirect (n,nx ) +
1
2
∑
nx∈N
Impact
(10),(11)
indirect (n,nx )
+
∑
o∈Obsx
φ
(
P 00,11[OC({n} , o)], P 01,10[OC({n} , o)])
+
1
2
∑
ng∈N
Impact
(10),(00)
indirect (ng ,n) +
1
2
∑
ng∈N
Impact
(01),(11)
indirect (ng ,n)

≤
∑
n∈N
ImpactobsREL({n}) + ∑
n′∈N
(
Impactobs−2REL ({n,n ′})
)
+
∑
n′∈N
(
+
1
2
Impact
(01),(00)
indirect (n,n
′) +
1
2
Impact
(10),(11)
indirect (n,n
′)
+
1
2
Impact
(10),(00)
indirect (n
′,n) +
1
2
Impact
(01),(11)
indirect (n
′,n)
))
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4.6 Approximating the Set of Compromised Nodes
It remains to be shown that the guarantees we compute can be approximated for every budget adversary.
To this end we show that the guarantee we get by maximizing the (slightly over-approximated) impact of
every node leads to a bound on the advantage of every adversary from the respective class.
Lemma 9 (Approximating N). For every anonymity notion αX with X ∈ {SA,RA,REL}, all senders
S0,S1 ∈ S, all recipients R0,R1 ∈ R, every path selection algorithm ps, and every budget B and every cost
function f , let ABf be any budget adversary that compromises the nodes in the set N
B,f
⊆ N . Then the impact
of compromising N can be bounded as follows:
(1) ImpactobsSA(N ∪ {R0}) ≤ ImpactobsSA (R0) + max
N†
B,f
⊆ N
∑
n∈N†
(
ImpactobsSA (n) + Impact
ind
SA(n,ABf )
)
.
(2) ImpactobsRA(N ∪ {S0}) ≤ ImpactobsRA (S0) + max
N†
B,f
⊆ N
∑
n∈N†
(
ImpactobsRA (n) + Impact
ind
RA(n,ABf )
)
.
(3) ImpactobsREL(N) ≤ max
N†
B,f
⊆ N
∑
n∈N†
(
ImpactcombinedREL (n) + Impact
ind
REL(n,ABf )
)
Proof. Let S0,S1 ∈ S be two senders and R0,R1 ∈ R be two recipients, and let N ′
B,f
⊆ N be any set of
compromised Tor nodes within the budget. We show each part separately. In each part we use the fact that
Impact
(ab),(cd)
indirect (n,n) = 0, which holds since a node cannot occur in the same circuit twice with non-zero
probability.
(1) By Lemma 6 we know that for N = N ′ ∪ {R0} we have
ImpactobsSA(N)
=
∑
o∈Obs
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
≤ ImpactobsSA (R0) +
∑
n∈N ′
(
ImpactobsSA (n) + ImpactRec1(n)
+
∑
n′∈N ′\{n}
(
Impact
(10)(00)
indirect (n,n
′) + ImpactRec2(n,n′)
)
≤ ImpactobsSA (R0) + max
N†
B,f
⊆ N
∑
n∈N†
(
ImpactobsSA (n) + ImpactRec1(n)
+ max
N∗
B−f(n),f
⊆ N
∑
n′∈N∗
(
Impact
(10)(00)
indirect (n,n
′) + ImpactRec2(n,n′)
)
= ImpactobsSA (R0) + max
N†
B,f
⊆ N
∑
n∈N†
(
ImpactobsSA (n) + Impact
ind
SA(n,ABf )
)
.
(2) By Lemma 7 we know that for N = N ′ ∪ {S0} we have
ImpactobsRA(N)
=
∑
o∈Obs
φ
(
P 00[OC(N, o)], P 10[OC(N, o)])
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≤ ImpactobsRA(S0) +
∑
n∈N ′
(
ImpactobsRA(n) + ImpactSen1(n)
+
∑
n′∈N ′\{n}
(
Impact
(01),(00)
indirect (n,n
′) + ImpactSen2(n,n
′)
)
≤ ImpactobsRA(S0) + max
N†
B,f
⊆ N
∑
n∈N†
(
ImpactobsRA(n) + ImpactSen1(n)
+ max
N∗
B−f(n),f
⊆ N
∑
n′∈N∗
(
Impact
(01),(00)
indirect (n,n
′) + ImpactSen2(n,n
′)
)
= ImpactobsRA (S0) + max
N†
B,f
⊆ N
∑
n∈N†
(
ImpactobsRA (n) + Impact
ind
RA(n,ABf )
)
.
(3) By Lemma 8 we know that for N = N ′ we have
∑
o∈Obs
φ
(
P 00,11[CO(N, o)], P 01,10[CO(N, o)])
≤
∑
n∈N
ImpactobsREL({n}) + ∑
n′∈N
(
Impactobs−2REL ({n,n ′})
)
+
∑
n′∈N
(
+
1
2
Impact
(01),(00)
indirect (n,n
′) +
1
2
Impact
(10),(11)
indirect (n,n
′)
+
1
2
Impact
(10),(00)
indirect (n
′,n) +
1
2
Impact
(01),(11)
indirect (n
′,n)
))
=
∑
n∈N
ImpactobsREL({n}) + ∑
n′∈N\n
(
Impactobs−2REL ({n,n ′})
)
+
∑
n′∈N\n
(
+
1
2
Impact
(01),(00)
indirect (n,n
′) +
1
2
Impact
(10),(11)
indirect (n,n
′)
+
1
2
Impact
(10),(00)
indirect (n
′,n) +
1
2
Impact
(01),(11)
indirect (n
′,n)
))
≤ max
N†
B,f
⊆ N
∑
n∈N†
ImpactobsREL({n}) + max
N∗
B−f(n),f
⊆ N
∑
n′∈N∗
(
Impactobs−2REL ({n,n ′})
)
+ max
N∗
B−f(n),f
⊆ N
∑
n′∈N∗
(
+
1
2
Impact
(01),(00)
indirect (n,n
′) +
1
2
Impact
(10),(11)
indirect (n,n
′)
+
1
2
Impact
(10),(00)
indirect (n
′,n) +
1
2
Impact
(01),(11)
indirect (n
′,n)
))
= max
N†
B,f
⊆ N
∑
n∈N†
(
ImpactcombinedREL (n,ABf ) + ImpactindREL(n,ABf )
)
Lemma 9 concludes our proof. We have shown that our anonymity guarantees indeed are sound upper
bounds on the anonymity impact of a budget adversary.
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5 Evaluation
In this section, we apply the computation proposed in Section 2 to recent Tor Metrics data [5] to quantify the
anonymity impact of various budget adversaries. Each of these adversaries is evaluated for Tor’s standard
path selection algorithm (short: TorPS) and for several commonly considered variants including SelekTOR
[21], DistribuTor [10], and LASTor [7]. Furthermore, we compute the anonymity impact of a path selection
transition phase, i.e., a small number of pioneering users decide to use an alternative path selection algorithm,
while the remaining users still run the original algorithm. We stress again that our evaluation assesses the
anonymity impact of structural attacks only, without taking any potential countermeasures by the users
or the Tor developers into account. Moreover, our evaluation only addresses the anonymity impact, and
disregards a potentially detrimental performance impact of the respective path selection algorithm.
We structure the section as follows. We first briefly review the evaluated path selection algorithms.
We then describe how we implemented the computation of ImpactX(A
B
f ), how we selected senders and
recipients for our analyses and which adversaries we considered in our evaluation. Finally, we present and
discuss the corresponding results for the anonymity impact.
5.1 Evaluated Path Selection Algorithms
The computation of ImpactX in Section 2 relies on the probability distribution ps(Si,Rj) over Tor circuits
that is induced by the considered path selection algorithm for sender Si and recipient Rj . For our evaluation,
we concretely instantiate this distribution using the Tor network consensus data. The dependence of Tor’s
path selection algorithm on a multitude of parameters (e.g., individual flags and weights of Tor nodes, family
relations, TCP ports required for a connection, parameters selected by senders, etc.) makes this a non-trivial
task. In addition to Tor’s default path selection algorithm, several variants have been proposed that strive
to improve performance or anonymity under specific assumptions. All of these variants are characterized by
the different probability distributions over Tor circuits they induce, and they can, hence, be evaluated by
means of ImpactX as well.
TorPS – Tor’s Standard Path Selection. We utilize MATor [10] for computing the distribution of
TorPS. TorPS randomly selects nodes based on their flags in the Tor consensus (e.g., only nodes with the
guard flag can become guard nodes, nodes with the flag bad-exit cannot be used as exit nodes, etc.) and, in
addition, for the exit node based on whether the ports required by the user are offered by the Tor node. The
path selection weights this random choice with the weight in the Tor consensus. If the sender has created at
least one circuit, the guard node selected in that circuit is used as the guard node in all subsequent circuits
as well. We refer to Tor’s specification [6] and to MATor [10] for a more detailed description.
UniformTor. Many existing works abstract Tor’s actual path selection as a uniform path selection algo-
rithm. In this variant of Tor, all (eligible) entry, middle, and exit nodes are chosen with the same weight.
SelekTOR. SelekTOR [21] restricts the Tor client to always select an exit node from a specific country, e.g.,
in order to bypass geo-restrictions of websites and services. SelekTOR only differs from TorPS in that the
weights of all Tor exit nodes outside the considered country are set to zero. In our evaluation, we consider
a SelekTOR configuration with exit nodes in the US.
DistribuTor. DistribuTor [10] aims to mitigate the anonymity impact of Tor nodes with very large
bandwidths by distributing the usage of guard nodes and exit nodes to the greatest possible extent. To
this end, DistribuTor modifies the node weights so that nodes with a very large bandwidth are mostly used
as middle nodes. Never used as middle nodes are those nodes with the guard or exit flag that have a low
bandwidth.
LASTor. LASTor [7] groups Tor nodes together into so-called clusters based on their physical location
(latitude and longitude), which it infers by their IP address via GeoIP. LASTor first selects a guard cluster,
a middle cluster, and an exit cluster. In this weighted random selection, LASTor weights the clusters inverse
to the distance of the path over them, where this path starts with the sender and ends with the recipient,
thereby reducing the expected physical distance. After selecting clusters, LASTor selects a node from each
cluster uniformly at random.
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Figure 8: ImpactX for different adversaries classes (from left to right): k-collusion, bandwidth, geographic,
and monetary.
5.2 Implementation
We have implemented the computation of ImpactX as an extension of the MATor [10] tool. MATor already
takes care of computing the probability distribution over Tor circuits for a given Tor network consensus and
the respective server descriptors. Hence, we added the calculations from Section 2 for any given budget
adversary ABf (·), the desired anonymity notion αX , and concrete senders S0,S1 and recipients R0,R1. To
this end, we first compute the individual impacts Impactobs for all observations of individual nodes, pairs
of nodes and – depending on the anonymity notion – relevant end points. Leveraging the computation from
ImpactobsX to ImpactX requires us to solve the underlying integer maximization problems, e.g., to determine
N ⊆ N such that ∑n∈N f(n) ≤ B becomes maximal. While this problem is known to be NP-hard, we can
solve it using a simple dynamic programming algorithm since the number of Tor nodes, and hence the size
of the considered instances, is sufficiently small. The source code of our implementation is available [2].
5.3 Senders and Recipients
Recall that our computations are with respect to specific senders S0,S1 and recipients R0,R1. For the
sake of evaluation, we hence consider concrete users in the following: the IP addresses from the affiliations
of the PC chairs of PETS2015 and PETS2016. The first user, S0, establishes a Tor circuit from Drexel
University in Philadelphia; the second user, S1, connects from Indiana University in Bloomington. As
possible destinations, we have selected TU Darmstadt as R0 and KU Leuven as R1. For both destinations,
we only required the HTTPS port 443 as the by far most widely used port for Tor connections (Tor is mainly
used via the Tor-Browser bundle, which includes HTTPS-Everywhere).
5.4 Evaluated Adversary Classes
We consider the following six instances of budget adversaries in our analysis. We evaluate the first four
instances for all considered path selection algorithms, whereas the last two instances are specific for TorPS.
k-collusion adversary. We evaluate the k-collusion adversary for up to 25 compromised nodes, i.e., for a
budget B ranging from 0 to 25.
Bandwidth adversary. We evaluate the bandwidth adversary for a budget B ranging from 1 MB/s to 10
GB/s.
Geographic adversary. We evaluate several adversaries that compromise all nodes in a given country or
set of countries. We consider the four top countries according to offered Tor bandwidth: Germany, France,
the Netherlands and the US. Moreover, we consider a collaboration of all countries of the European Union
(abbreviated EU) and a collaboration of the US, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia
(the so-called Five Eyes, abbreviated FVEY).
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Monetary adversary. We evaluate a monetary adversary with a monthly budget B in US dollars, ranging
from 103 to 108 US dollars. Recall that the cost function f$ assigns each node its monthly cost, depending
on a price function price(n.provider,n.BW). We instantiate price for the 8 largest providers hosting Tor
nodes (Amazon, DigitalOcean, Hetzner, LeaseWeb, myLoc, Online, OVH, and STRATO), accounting for
approximately 13 of Tor bandwidth as follows. For each provider P in this list we set price(P, BW) to the
cost of the cheapest server offered by this provider that has at least a bandwidth of BW. For all remaining
nodes (that are not hosted by these providers), price(·) assigns the average consumer price per bandwidth,
depending on the node’s country, taken from Ookla’s NetIndex [1] per country.
Vulnerable Tor Versions (TorPS only): We evaluate a predicate adversary for a critical Tor software
update. The recently released update 0.2.6.10 solves many stability issues. The Tor blog recommends that
every Tor node running an older version, especially an older version of 0.2.6 should update [4]. For presenting
an example analysis of a Tor version predicate, we assume that there was a vulnerability in all Tor versions
prior to the 0.2.6 branch and that the Vulnerable Tor adversary compromises all Tor nodes that run a Tor
version between 0.2.6 and 0.2.6.10.
Guard Discovery Adversary (TorPS only): Recently, Tor has implemented a new strategy for selecting
guard nodes called ”One Fast Guard for Life” ([13]) that aims at improving longtime sender anonymity (and
relationship anonymity to some extent). A sender selects a guard node once and uses it continuously over a
period of 9 months to mitigate the danger imposed by frequently selecting fresh guard nodes and, moreover,
to mitigate the danger imposed by selecting a recognizable set of guard nodes. We evaluate the anonymity
impact of the first four aforementioned adversaries on the anonymity of guard nodes, effectively measuring
their success to perform guard discovery attacks. Strictly speaking, this adversary does not constitute a
single budget adversary, but a specific setting that is parametric in a considered budget adversary.
5.5 Results
Unless stated otherwise in a specific experiment, we used the following data in our evaluation: Our evaluation
was conducted on Tor network consensus data over the course of one year (August 2014-July 2015), where we
calculated the anonymity impact of the considered adversaries on four consensus data per day (at midnight,
6 a.m., noon and 6 p.m.). Additionally, we conducted extensive evaluations over the course of one year
for the first four adversaries considered in Section 5.4, with the following budget choices: 10 compromised
nodes for k-collusion adversary, 1 GB/s for the bandwidth adversary, Five Eyes for the geographic adversary,
and 100,000 USD/mo monthly budget for the monetary adversary. The results – for sender, recipient and
relationship anonymity – are depicted in Figure 13 in Appendix A, where we averaged the results per day
to minimize day-time dependencies. For all other graphs we averaged all results to minimize any short-time
impacts.
Remark: Please note that all of our evaluations consider the worst-case adversary for the respective class,
i.e., we calculate and plot the maximal adversarial impact within this class to give an anonymity guarantee
against this type of adversary. For example, the k-collusion adversary will compromise the k nodes with
the highest impact for the considered anonymity notion and not just some subset of k nodes. Likewise, we
consider the worst-case adversary for each notion separately, i.e., the adversary may compromise different
nodes for each of the anonymity notion.
5.5.1 Evaluating Tor’s Path Selection Algorithm
The results of our evaluation of TorPS are depicted in Figure 8.
Results – k-collusion adversary (left, Fig. 8). Our results confirm the (known) strong anonymity
impact of a small number of high-bandwidth Tor nodes – a collusion of 10 Tor nodes results in a reduction
of sender anonymity of 9.2%, a reduction of recipient anonymity of 15.4% and a reduction of relationship
anonymity of 0.8%. The reduction of anonymity grows sub-linearly in k for sender anonymity and recipient
anonymity, and more than linearly in k for relationship anonymity. A reduction of anonymity of > 95%
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Figure 9: Adversarial Impact for sender, recipient and relationship anonymity against the Vulnerable Tor
Version adversary.
amounts to 915 compromised nodes for sender anonymity, 330 compromised nodes for recipient anonymity,
and 1230 compromised nodes for relationship anonymity.
Results – bandwidth adversary (2nd left, Fig. 8). The plot shows the reduction of anonymity on a
logarithmic scale axis. An adversary compromising nodes with at most 1 GB/s of average bandwidth achieves
a reduction of sender anonymity of 22.4%, a reduction of recipient anonymity of 30.0%, and a reduction of
relationship anonymity of 3.8%. A reduction of anonymity of > 95% amounts to compromised bandwidth
of 250 GB/s (for sender anonymity), 65 GB/s (for recipient anonymity), and 310 GB/s (for relationship
anonymity).
Results – geographic adversary (2nd right, Fig. 8). Our results in particular show that no country
on its own can successfully break relationship anonymity with a significant probability. However, their
collaboration, in the case of the European Union, would be capable of deanonymize a significant amount of
Tor traffic (anonymity impact of 53% for relationship anonymity), which significantly surpasses the advantage
of the Five Eyes adversary (1.1%). We stress again that these results are specific to structural attacks against
nodes, and do not take adversary-controlled network structure into account (such as monitoring traffic of
domestic ISPs).
Results – monetary adversary (right, Fig. 8). An adversary running Tor nodes with a monthly cost
of 100,000 USD at most reduces sender anonymity by 41.8%, recipient anonymity by 29.3% and relationship
anonymity by 10.0%. The smaller reduction of recipient anonymity compared to sender anonymity stems
from the fact that the prices of hosting guard nodes, on average, are significantly lower than the prices of
hosting exit nodes. A reduction of anonymity of > 95% amounts to monthly costs of 8.75 Mio. USD (for
sender anonymity), 27.5 Mio. USD (for recipient anonymity), and 40 Mio. USD (for relationship anonymity).
Vulnerable Tor Versions (Fig. 9). Our evaluation shows that on August 15th, i.e., one month after
the release of the fix, the Tor version adversary still achieves a reduction of anonymity of 16.33% for sender
anonymity, of 16.4% for recipient anonymity and of 2.67% for relationship anonymity. We refer to Figure 9
for a graph showing the reduction of anonymity of this adversary over the course of one month after the
release of Tor version 0.2.6.10.
Anonymity Against Guard Discovery Attacks (Fig. 12). We selected a set of Tor consensus data
(28 consensus data from July 23rd to July 29th 2015, taken each 6 hours) and from each of these consensus
data we selected the top 25 guard nodes that share their /16 subnet with at least one exit node (which
effectively affects around 45% of Tor guard nodes). Subsequently, we compared the anonymity impact of
a budget adversary in distinguishing these guards, i.e., for all pairs of selected guard nodes (ng0,ng1) with
ng0 6= ng1, we proceeded as follows: First, S0 selects ng0 as guard node and S1 selects ng1 as guard node.
Second, we set the costs for compromising ng0 or ng1 to ∞ to disallow the adversary to compromise the
respective guard nodes. Finally, we compute the sender anonymity impact.
Even without compromised nodes, a compromised recipient reduces sender anonymity by 2.12% on av-
erage. We furthermore evaluated our four aforementioned adversaries against the selected pairs of guard
nodes. Our results, depicted in Figure 12 in Appendix A, show that the relationship between the adver-
sarial advantage in the normal case and our guard discovery strategy differs strongly for the considered
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Figure 10: The difference between ImpactX for sender (top), recipient (middle) and relationship (bottom)
anonymity of alternative path selection algorithms and TorPS. Cionsidered adversaries classes (from left to
right): k-collusion, bandwidth, geographic, and monetary.
adversaries. For the k-collusion adversary for instance, with more than 8 compromised nodes, the adversary
obtains a smaller anonymity impact in the guard-discovery scenario; in contrast to that, the difference in
the anonymity impact of a monetary adversary becomes larger the more money it spends.
5.5.2 Alternative Path Selection Algorithms
The results of our evaluation of alternative path selection algorithms are depicted in Figure 10 – from top to
bottom: sender anonymity, recipient anonymity, and relationship anonymity, showing the differences between
the anonymity impacts of the alternative path selection algorithm and TorPS.
UniformTor. It is commonly believed that the uniform distribution over all nodes offers the highest
degree of anonymity. Against k-collusion adversaries, this is certainly true. However, an adversary that
compromises a certain amount of bandwidth can compromise a large number of low-bandwidth nodes even
with a small budget. In case of a monetary adversary, 10 Mio. USD constitutes the break-even point at
which the uniform path selection actually exhibits better anonymity guarantees (but at this point, anonymity
has degenerated to a large extent anyway). The anomaly is caused by expensive nodes contributing a very
small advantage in case of uniform path selection.
SelekTOR. As SelekTOR only restricts the choice for an exit node, sender anonymity is comparable to
Tor, while relationship anonymity and in particular recipient anonymity suffers significantly, for essentially
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Figure 11: ImpactX for sender and relationship anonymity during the transition phase for different adver-
sarial strategies (from left to right): k-collusion, bandwidth, geographic, and monetary.
all considered adversaries. As expected, the geographic adversary that compromises all nodes within the US
can break recipient anonymity with 100% probability (it always controls the exit node and can perform a
traffic correlation).
DistribuTor. DistribuTor in particular modifies the selection of entry nodes by capping the possible weights
of nodes at a certain point. Consequently, it achieves better sender anonymity and relationship anonymity
guarantees against k-collusion adversaries (against which it has been designed), but does not exhibit a clear
advantage against bandwidth adversaries. Since it uses modified weights (especially for entry nodes), its
sender anonymity is, in comparison to Tor’s sender anonymity, slightly less prone against European country
adversaries, but more vulnerable against the US country adversary (since there are more smaller entry nodes
in the US).
LASTor. Since our structural adversaries do not perform network-based attacks, an evaluation of LASTor,
which is designed to counter network-based attacks, is slightly unfair. Still we gained interesting insights by
our analysis. The uniform distribution of the node weights within LASTor’s “geo-location buckets”, leads to
significantly better results against a k-collusion adversary. However, even a small amount of compromised
bandwidth suffices for completely breaking anonymity, as even a small, compromised middle node can gain
information about the location of both sender and recipient of a communication: entry and exit nodes have
significantly different weights for different locations. Note that LASTor (as presented in [7]) additionally
restricts circuits depending on whether traffic is expected to be routed through the same autonomous system
twice. This additional restriction, however, only increases the advantage of a structural adversary.
To further evaluate LASTor, we also ran analyses swapping one recipient with one sender (TU Darmstadt
with Indiana University). This is displayed as LASTor (2) in Figure 10. As expected, this more diverse
selection of sender and recipient had a negative impact on the anonymity guarantees.
5.5.3 Transition Phase
In existing evaluations of alternative path selection algorithms, the major impeding anonymity factor that is
typically omitted is the so-called transition phase, i.e., a small number of users is already using an alternative
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of Tor’s path selection algorithm, whereas the vast majority still uses the standard one. Intuitively, there are
not yet enough users with the alternative path selection algorithm to provide a sufficiently large anonymity
set. Figure 11 depicts the adversary’s advantage in such scenarios (for sender and relationship anonymity
only, since these are the only two anonymity notions affected by this algorithmic transition).
Our analyses show that even adversaries that do not compromise any single Tor node have a tremendous
advantage in distinguishing a user that relies on an alternative path selection algorithm from a regular
Tor user: for SelekTOR, the adversary has an advantage of 92.89%, for LASTor an advantage of 85.87%
and for the uniform path selection, the adversary has an advantage of 68.14%. In case of SelekTOR, this
advantage arises mostly from the fact, that a normal user would choose a US exit node with only ≈ 7%
probability, whereas a SelekTOR user always uses such an exit node. For LASTor and the uniform path
selection algorithm, circuits containing small nodes are chosen with a much higher probability in comparison
to TorPS. The effect of the transition phase on DistribuTor is less drastic, but still noticeable. We attribute
this result to the close similarity of DistribuTor and TorPS. However, the fact that the weights of entry nodes
are heavily modified grants compromised middle nodes an advantage in distinguishing between a TorPS user
and a DistribuTor user.
Mitigating the Risk of the Transition Phase. The high vulnerability of users that use a non-standard
path selection algorithm indicates that a slow and voluntary transition from one algorithm to another might
alienate the (few) users that migrate first and thus significantly weaken their anonymity. We think that as
soon as a transition is necessary, the novel algorithm should be rolled out to all users at once, in order to
shorten the transition phase. With this strategy, all users would intuitively remain in the same anonymity
set.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a rigorous methodology for quantifying the anonymity provided by Tor
against a variety of structural attacks, i.e., adversaries that compromise Tor nodes and thereby perform
eavesdropping attacks to deanonymize Tor users. We have made the following two tangible contributions.
First, we have provided the first algorithmic approach for soundly computing the anonymity impact of
such structural attacks against Tor. We have devised formalizations of various instantiations of structural
attacks against Tor, and we have subsequently proven that the computed anonymity impact for each of
these adversaries constitutes a worst-case anonymity bound for the cryptographic realization of Tor, up to a
negligible additive factor. We have furthermore shown that our approach is sequentially composable, which
we consider to be of independent interest. Second, we have demonstrated the applicability of our approach
to large-scale analyses by performing the to date largest rigorous anonymity evaluation of Tor’s anonymity.
Concretely, we have established worst-case anonymity bounds against various structural attacks for Tor and
for alternative path selection algorithms such as DistribuTor, SelekTOR, and LASTor, yielding the first
rigorous, quantitative anonymity comparison between these algorithms. We have moreover quantified the
anonymity impact of a path selection transition phase, showing that a small number of pioneering users who
decide to run a (potentially improved) alternative path selection algorithm first while the majority of users
still runs the original algorithm, face severe risks of being deanonymized.
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Figure 13: Changes in the adversarial Impact against selected adversarial strategies for Tor’s path selection
during the last year. Note, that the Y axis scales from 0 to 0.6 for sender and recipient anonymity plots,
and from 0 to 0.3 for relationship anonymity.
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Figure 14: Changes in the adversarial Impact against relationship anonymity for different strategies (from
top left): k-collusion adversary compromising 10 nodes, resource-constrained bandwidth adversary com-
promising 1 GB/s, Five Eyes countries and monetary adversary with budget of $100,000 per month, for
alternative path selection algorithms. Note, that each plot has an individual scale on Y axis to improve
readability.
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Figure 15: Changes in the adversarial Impact of k-collusion adversary compromising 10 nodes, in sender
and recipient anonymity, for alternative path selection algorithms.
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Figure 16: Changes in the adversarial Impact of resource-constrained bandwidth adversary compromising
nodes of total bandwidth up to 1 GB/s, in sender and recipient anonymity, for alternative path selection
algorithms.
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Figure 17: Changes in the adversarial Impact of Five Eyes countries, in sender and recipient anonymity,
for alternative path selection algorithms.
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Figure 18: Changes in the adversarial Impact of monetary adversary with budget $100,000, in sender and
recipient anonymity, for alternative path selection algorithms.
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